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HOOD v. DUMOND: A STUDY OF THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE IDEOLOGY OF CAPITALISM
JACK MICHELt
This Comment explores the cultural and ideological meaning of a
single Supreme Court decision, H.P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond.1 At
issue in Hood was section 258-c of article 21 of the New York Agricul-
ture and Markets Law,2 part of a body of law framed in response to
the agricultural crisis of the Depression. Section 258-c was designed to
control the size and scale of New York milk processing plants in order
to prevent a few purchaser-dealers from dominating local milk markets
and to halt the ongoing and accelerating migration of farmers from the
land. In a five-to-four decision written by Justice Jackson, over angry
dissents by Justices Black and Frankfurter, the Court in 1948 invali-
dated this New York law. In the process of invalidating New York's
attempt to ameliorate the plight of its farmers, the Court rejected the
long-standing cultural ideal of America as a collection of locally con-
trolled rural communities and adopted instead a vision of a nationally
controlled, industrial economy and society.
The New York law provided that the New York Commissioner of
Agriculture could refuse to grant a license to a milk dealer to enter a
market, build new facilities, or expand existing facilities if the dealer's
plans would "tend to a destructive competition in a market already ade-
quately served,"' or would otherwise not be in the public interest. 4 Al-
though there was no showing that denying Boston milk distributor
H.P. Hood & Sons a license to build its third milk processing plant in
the Albany-Troy region of New York actually affected the volume of
t A.B. 1970, Wesleyan University; M.A. 1977, Ph.D. Candidate (History of Cul-
ture), University of Chicago; J.D. 1985, University of Pennsylvania. The author wrote
this Comment while a student at the University of Pennsylvania Law School.
1 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
2 Act of Mar. 30, 1934, ch. 126, § 258-c, 1934 N.Y. Laws 564, 575-76 (codified
as amended at N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTs. LAW § 258-c (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1985)).
3Id.
" See id. For Supreme Court interpretations of other provisions of the New York
Agriculture and Markets Law, see Mayflower Farms v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 266, 271-
72 (1936) (holding that distinguishing among milk dealers on the basis of date of entry
into business was unconstitutional); Borden's Farm Prods. Co. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S.
251, 261-63 (1936) (upholding a distinction between dealers with "well-advertised
trade names" and those without); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 521 (1934)
(upholding the fixing of minimum prices for retail milk sales).
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milk flowing in commerce,5 the Court ruled that the denial of the li-
cense under section 258-c impermissibly restricted interstate com-
merce.6 By virtue of Justice Jackson's expansive reading of the restric-
tions that the dormant commerce clause placed on the ability of states
to pass economic and social legislation, Hood became one of the touch-
stone cases in the modern expansion of the federal commerce power."
Hood was likewise important in the particular context of the social
and cultural history of modern American agriculture. By precluding a
state from controlling the size of agricultural processing operations,
Hood provided a part of the legal basis for the steady increase in con-
centration in the food processing industry and the corresponding decline
in farmer bargaining power that has characterized the recent agricul-
tural history of America.8 Jackson's opinion implicitly legitimated the
expansion of farm size and the consequent displacement of rural people
I See Hood, 336 U.S. at 561 (Black, J., dissenting) ("[Hlere there is no evidence
whatever to show that fair enforcement of the New York law would limit the total
volume of New York milk available for shipment into other states."); see also infra text
accompanying notes 96-101 & 116-20.
1 See Hood, 336 U.S. at 545.
Although a full history of the expansion of the federal commerce power in the
mid-twentieth century is beyond the scope of this Comment, some understanding of the
history of the dormant commerce clause is essential to a proper consideration of Hood.
The dormant commerce clause rests on an inference: that the constitutional grant of
power to Congress to regulate commerce among the states can be understood to pre-
clude states from enacting legislation that affects interstate commerce even absent an
affirmative exercise of the commerce power by Congress. As late as 1938, the Court
limited this inference and upheld state legislation that affected commerce unless such
legislation was empirically shown to burden or discriminate against commerce. See
South Carolina Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 189 (1938). In 1945,
however, the Court imported into the dormant commerce clause doctrine reasoning that
focused on the economic effects of state regulation. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona,
325 U.S. 761, 781 (1945) (using a "practical effects" test to invalidate an Arizona
regulation on the length of trains); see also NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1936) (noting under the positive commerce clause that while the
concept of interstate commerce should not be expanded so far as to "obliterate the
distinction between what is national and what is local" all intrastate activities with a
"close and substantial relation to commerce" were capable of being regulated under the
federal commerce power). As argued in this Comment, Hood went one step further by
employing a "theoretical effects" test. See infra text accompanying notes 96-106.
Scholars have argued that the expansion of the commerce clause doctrine was mo-
tivated by "social" concerns, see, e.g., Stem, The Commerce Clause and the National
Economy, 1933-1946, 59 HARV. L. REv. 645 (1946); however, an equally plausible
argbment can be made that this expansion was precipitated by the expansion of the
national economy and the need of business to regularize transactions. See infra text
accompanying notes 149-68. For analyses of the forces leading to the growth of national
economies, see D. DOWD, THE TWISTED DREAM: CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES SINCE 1776, at 218-37, 290-309 (2d ed. 1977); R. EDWARDS, M.
REICH & T. WEISSKOPF, THE CAPITALIST SYSTEM 481-99 (2d ed. 1978).
8 See infra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 134:657
IDEOLOGI7 OF HOOD V. DUMOND
from the land.' Finally, and in some ways most important, Hood was
one of a line of Supreme Court decisions that transferred the control of
economic and social life from the local to the national level.10
This Comment develops a model for reading court opinions and
applies that model to Hood in order to promote an understanding of the
economic and social functions of the law."1 As made forcefully apparent
by the recent rise to prominence of normative critiques of legal rules
and reasoning, the law is a social and cultural artifact.1 2 It is easier to
assert this truism, however, than to explain its meaning. The model
developed here is grounded in the assumption that what we take to be
reality can be meaningfully understood only insofar as it is organized
and described by language. From this point of view, court opinions, like
other forms of discourse, can be understood as exercises in reality mak-
ing.1" The legal rules that an opinion promulgates derive from the as-
sumptions that the court makes about the nature, both actual and de-
sired, of reality. Any opinion, in short, encodes an entire world view, in
the service of which its rules operate.
14
' See infra text accompanying notes 93-106.
10 See infra text accompanying notes 152-68.
"I The view taken throughout this Comment is heavily influenced by the sociology
of knowledge as explained and popularized by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann.
See P. BERGER & T. LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY: A
TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (1967). According to their formulation,
humans must provide a stable environment for their conduct. See id. at 59. This envi-
ronment is provided by the linguistic organization of phenomena. Thus, the apparent
objectivity of the world is a "humanly produced, constructed objectivity." Id. at 60; see
also B. BERNSTEIN, CLASS, CODES AND CONTROL: THEORETICAL STUDIES TOWARDS
A SOCIOLOGY OF LANGUAGE 136-37 (2d rev. ed. 1974) (arguing that language is em-
bedded in and defines social reality); Bidney, Myth, Symbolism, and Truth, in MYTH:
A SYMPOSIUM 14 (T. Sebeok ed. 1965) ("[M]yth objectifies and organizes human
hopes and fears . . ... "); Whorf, The Relation of Habitual Thought and Behaviour to
Language, in LANGUAGE IN THINKING 123, 126-28 (P. Adams ed. 1973) (describing
the relationship of language to culture and arguing that language and culture are dia-
lectically shaped).
12 An example of such an approach is that known as "critical legal studies." For
an introduction to the range of work represented by this approach, see THE POLITIcS
OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (D. Kairys ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as PoL-
TICS OF LAW]; Critical Legal Studies Symposium, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1984). See also
R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLrrICS 63-103 (1975) (criticizing the liberal bases of
modern legal thought). Approaches as different from critical legal studies as "legal phi-
losophy" and "law and economics" also argue that the law fails to conform adequately
to selected normative criteria. See, e.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 17-
18 (2d ed. 1977) (observing that economics, by which the author means micro-
economics, can play a reformative role in law). See generally M. TIGAR & M.
LEVY, LAW AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM 230-41 (1977) (discussing the values un-
derlying several schools of legal thought).
"' For a formulation of this approach in the context of legal scholarship, see
Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in POLITICS OF LAW, supra note 12, at
287-90 (describing law as one kind of intellectual-linguistic system building).
14 This is what is usually referred to as "legitimation." See, e.g., P. BERGER & T.
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Like any set of world views, those encoded in legal opinions are
continually in the process of being formed and reformed.15 Legal con-
troversies represent the attempts of individuals and groups to reform
the legal view of reality to conform to their interests. Each time a case
is decided and a new opinion is issued, the legal world view is reformed
in varying degree, depending upon the outcome of the case.
Legal opinions, by virtue of being continually contested, are simi-
lar to all other social constructions of reality."' Unlike other forms of
reality making, however, court opinions are sanctioned by the force of
the state. A legal controversy is not merely a controversy about the con-
struction of reality; it is also a struggle for the access to physical force
granted to those whose version of reality is accepted. When a case is
LUCKMANN, supra note 11, at 93 (describing legitimation as the ascription of cognitive
validity to linguistically objectified meanings); J. HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS
22 (T. McCarthy trans. 1975) (describing the "socially integrative" characteristic of
ideology); M. TIGAR & M. LEVY, supra note 12, at 279 (describing law as the crystal-
lization of social relations); Gordon, supra note 13, at 288 (describing the integrative
character of system building).
15 See P. BERGER & T. LUCKMANN, supra note 11, at 61 ("[Tlhe relationship
between man, the producer, and the social world, his product, is and remains a dialecti-
cal one."); M. TIGAR & M. LEVY, supra note 12, at 288-89 (describing the process by
which legal ideology crystallizes social and economic relations and then becomes an
empty form, only to be recrystallized). This Comment is an extended investigation of
the process of reforming legal world views in the narrow context of a single case. In
conceiving the process of legal world building as dialectical, the Comment joins scholars
who deny that legal ideology serves class interests in narrow, simple-minded ways. See,
e.g., C. GEERTZ, Ideology as a Cultural System, in THE INTERPRETATION OF CUL-
TURES: SELECTED ESSAYS 202 (1973) (arguing that a pure interest theory of ideology
suffers from a too-muscular sociology and a too-anemic psychology). Rather, the Com-
ment regards ideology as a process by which both the nature of reality and the relation-
ships among the groups and classes that compose that reality are constantly being refor-
mulated and objectified. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 13, at 288 (observing that legal
world views are necessarily believed by some of those whom they disserve as well as
those whose intdrests they seem most obviously to serve). While the law inevitably
serves the dominant classes better than the underclasses, it does so primarily by formu-
lating favorable synthetic accounts of social reality, not by frankly coercing disbelievers.
18 Perhaps the most intuitively obvious example of a social construction of reality
is the concept of family. Human biology is identical everywhere, but no concept varies
more widely from place to place, across time, and across cultures than that of family.
See, e.g., G. MURDOCK, SOCIAL STRUCTURE 108-10 (1966) (summarizing cross-cul-
tural differences in kinship terminology and the causes of such differences). The evolu-
tionary nature of concepts of family is evident from our own history. Compare D.
SCHNEIDER, AMERICAN KINSHIP: A CULTURAL ACCOUNT 37 (1968) (The twentieth-
century American concept of family is preeminently nuclear and biological.) with E.
MORGAN, THE PURITAN FAMILY 150 (1966) (The seventeenth-century New England
family extended beyond the bounds of the modem family.). That cultural concepts of
family are contested is evident in recent case law. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 498-99 (1977) (invalidating a city zoning ordinance that re-
quired a family to exclude certain blood relatives). To the extent that a court opinion
depends on, adduces, or invokes culturally determined beliefs, such as those involving
the family, the opinion is necessarily part of an evolving intellectual construction of
social reality.
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decided, one party wins and gets real power. Over time the legal reality
of the opinion becomes autonomous-separate from the reality in
which it originated. This now autonomous linguistic reality becomes a
part of our collective stock of knowledge about the social world. The
opinion comes to seem true and to control our ability to shape our lives.
As this model suggests, to ignore the interplay of social forces that
produces an opinion is to miss the meaning of that opinion for those
whose lives the court's decision will govern. The full construction of the
decision's meaning requires a reconstruction of those forces. To under-
stand a judicial opinion, we must seek to understand not only the real-
ity the opinion endorses but also the reality it rejects; we must seek to
understand not only the issue between the parties but also the larger
social issues and forces those parties represent.
This Comment tries to articulate the meaning of Hood by placing
the state legislation and the Supreme Court opinions in their appropri-
ate historical, social, and economic contexts and exploring in some de-
tail the world the Court rejected in order to illuminate the world it
accepted. Part I presents the historical background and economic theory
of the New York Agriculture and Markets Law. Part II analyzes the
logic of both Justice Jackson's invalidation of that law and the dissent-
ers' arguments that the law must stand. Part III examines the broad
social and historical contexts of the Hood opinions in order to clarify
the vision of political economy that Hood endorsed. Taken together,
these excursions into the several contexts of Hood provide a rich, albeit
partial, sense of the Court's choice between, on the one hand, the tradi-
tional world of local, rural culture, and on the other, the modern world
of national, industrial culture.
I. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF DEPRESSION FARM
LEGISLATION: AN AGRICULTURAL CRISIS AND
NEW YORK'S RESOLUTION
A. Depression on the Farm
After almost a century of steady migration from farm to town and
city, 117 and after forty years of nearly unrelieved agricultural reces-
17 The migration of people from country to city and the industrialization of a once
predominantly rural economy are axioms of our history. The beginnings of this trans-
formation of American life lie in the first quarter of the nineteenth century. See, e.g., J.
HENRETrA, THE EvoLUTION OF AMERICAN SOCIETY 1700-1815, at 204 table 6.3
(1973) (proportion of agricultural workers dropped from 82.6% in 1800 to 53.2% in
1860) (citing David, The Growth of Real Product in the United States Before 1840, 27
J. ECON. HisT. 151, 166 table 4, 184 table 8 (1967)); L. TWEETEN, FOUNDATIONS OF
FARM POLICY 126 table 5.1 (1970) (The proportion of workers in agriculture dropped
1986]
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sion, 8 the arrival of the twentieth century ushered in the "farmer's
from 83.5% in 1800 to 64% in 1840, to 21.5% in 1930, and to 9.5% in 1960.).
18 As the author of a standard history of American farming puts it, between 1867
and 1898 farmers "endured nearly continuous depression." J. SCHLEBECKER,
WHEREBY WE THRIVE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN FARMING 1607-1972, at 161
(1975). For other short, readable narrative histories of agriculture in these years, see
W. COCHRANE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN AGRICULTURE: A HISTORICAL
ANALYSIS 78-98 (1979); G. FITE, AMERICAN FARMERS: THE NEW MINORITY 1-19
(1981).
The sustained agrarian crises of the last quarter of the nineteenth century pro-
duced Populism, the first self-consciously agrarian political movement. See, e.g., J.
HICKS, THE POPULIST REVOLT: A HISTORY OF THE FARMER'S ALLIANCE AND THE
PEOPLE'S PARTY 95 (1931) (summarizing the sources of agrarian discontent). Follow-
ing John Hicks, Norman Pollock found in Populism the basis for a sweeping critique
of the emerging industrial order. See N. POLLOCK, THE POPULIST RESPONSE TO IN-
DUSTRIAL AMERICA 25 (1962) ("Populism criticized industrial America for creating
not only poverty, but a new man-alienated man."). More recently, in his brilliant study
of upcountry Georgia, Steven Hahn has developed a more sophisticated yet still-similar
view of the cognitive disjunction that industrialization wrought in American thinking.
See S. HAHN, THE RooTS OF SOUTHERN POPULISM 282 (1982) ("To the hegemony of
the marketplace, Populism counterposed the vision of a producers' common-
wealth .... ).
Some understanding of the flowering of agrarian discontent in these years is im-
portant for an understanding of the issues in Hood. Drawing upon the ancient English
rhetoric of the independent yeoman, the farmer's movement began transforming that
rhetoric from a normative vision of the good society into a minority political program.
See, e.g., R. HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 23-26 (1958) (describing the process
by which the myth of the yeoman was incorporated into American politics); see also J.
CREVECOEUR, LETTERS FROM AN AMERICAN FARMER 61 (1782 & photo. reprint
1968) (defining an American as a "possessor of the soil").
As the nineteenth century wore on, this vision of a predominantly agricultural
society of yeomen became increasingly divorced from reality, but the vision endured.
See, e.g., G. FITE, supra, at 244 ("Many citizens are still struggling in the early 1980's
to reconcile modernized agriculture and its effects on rural America with emotions and
traditions that lie deep in pre-industrial farming."); R. NYE, MIDWESTERN PROGRES-
SIVE POLITICS: A HISTORICAL STUDY OF ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENTS 1870-
1958, at 15 (1959) ("The primary problem of America after 1865 was to resolve the
clash between the old ideals of agrarian democracy and the new industrialism . . .");
J. SHOVER, FIRST MAJORITYnLAST MINORITY: THE TRANSFORMING OF RURAL
LIFE IN AMERICA 12 (1976) (citing polls that indicated that in 1953, 1966, and 1970 a
majority of Americans preferred country to city life and concluding that "[t]he agrarian
past lingers with peculiar tenacity in popular thought and culture").
The constellation of ideas that made up the Populist vision of a predominantly
agrarian America has been a major influence on American farm policy throughout the
twentieth century, producing legislation such as that represented by article 21. See, e.g.,
G. CRAMER & C. JENSEN, AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS AND AGRIBUSINESS 287 (3d
ed. 1985) (basic-level text in agricultural economics discussing effects of "farm values"
on farm policy); Flinn & Johnson, Agrarianism Among Wisconsin Farmers, 39 RU-
RAL SOC. 187, 187 (1974) (basic discussion of the history of American agrarian ideol-
ogy). In a nutshell, agrarianism provided an alternative to Justice Jackson's ebullient
vision of an expanding, market-oriented society. See infra text accompanying notes
149-68. While these two social visions have sometimes coincided, see R. HOFSTADTER,
supra, at 46-47 (arguing that agrarianism was not always at odds with market-ori-
ented behavior), they came into sharp conflict in Hood. This Comment argues that,
considered as a cultural event, the Hood case presented the Court with a sharp contrast
between the ideology of agrarianism and that of industrialism. In deciding that the
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golden age." 19 For two decades, the long, slow transformation of
America from a nation of yeomen to one of workers seemed to have
halted. When the 1920's arrived, almost a third of our population still
lived on 6.5 million farms.2"
In the autumn of 1920, however, farm prices dropped sharply in
the face of post-war recession. 21 Then, between 1929 and 1936, in the
throes of a world-wide depression, the bottom fell from beneath
America's farmers as prices declined by a full two-thirds in seven
years.2 2 In the next decade another million farmers abandoned agricul-
agrarian vision was not a legitimate social vision for a state to pursue, Hood rejected a
deeply rooted, major strain in American social thought and provided a part of the legal
context for the subsequent decline in the vitality of local rural cultures.
19 With the possible exception of the period from 1945 to 1948, the first decades
of the twentieth century were the best years of the century for farmers. See, e.g., W.
COCHRANE, FARM PRICES: MYTH AND REALITY 12 (1958) (indexes of farm prices
from 1826 to 1956); G. FITE, supra note 18, at 16-17 (briefly describing the high farm
prices of the early twentieth century and their effects); see also M. BENEDICT, FARM
POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES 1790-1950, at 450 (1953) (On an index in which
prices from 1910 to 1914 were set equal to 100, prices rose to 116 in 1941 and to 180
in 1945, and "an enormous further increase was to be recorded in 1946, 1947, and
1948."); G. FITE, supra note 18, at 87 (describing succinctly the prosperity of the
1940's). At the depths of the Depression, policymakers took the years 1909 to 1914 as
the touchstone of a healthy agricultural economy. The Soil Conservation and Domestic
Allotment Act of 1936, for example, attempted to restore "the ratio between the
purchasing power of the net income per person on farms and that of the income per
person not on farms that prevailed during the five year period August 1909-July
1914." Pub. L. No. 74-461, § 7(a), 49 Stat. 1148, 1148 (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. § 590g (1982)).
20 See G. CRAMER & C. JENSEN, supra note 18, at 29 table 2.6 (proportion of
population on farms); see also G. FrrE, supra note 18, at 101 (chart showing trends in
American farming,. 1935-1980); J. SHOVER, supra note 18, at 6 (net migration from
farm population, 1920-1974); USDA, A TIME To CHOOSE: SUMMARY REPORT ON
THE STRUCTURE OF AGRICULTURE 42 (1981) (graph showing number of farms, 1920-
1980).
21 See W. COCHRANE, supra note 19, at 18 (describing the fall in prices in 1920
as a "disaster" for farmers); id. at 12, 14 (indexes of farm prices, 1826-1956); G. FITE,
supra note 18, at 34-37 (chronicling the precipitous drop in prices and farm incomes in
the early years of the 1920's); L. TWEETEN, supra note 17, at 73 ("The index of farm
prices fell from 211 in 1920 to 124 in 1921 [1910-1914=100] and was never over 156
during the remainder of the 1920's.").
22 See G. FrrE, supra note 18, at 51 (estimating the price drop in agricultural
products at 63% for the years 1929-1933); L. TWEETEN, supra note 17, at 77 (The
farm price index (1910-1914=100) fell to 65 in 1932.). Prices tended to move down-
ward rapidly in these years, and everywhere the story was equally dismal. See, e.g., W.
COCHRANE, supra note 19, at 14 figure 2; R. INGALLS, HERBERT H. LEHMAN AND
NEW YORK'S LITTLE NEW DEAL 151 (1975) (New York milk prices, which had held
up well during the first years of the Depression, declined by 38% in two months in the
winter of 1931-1932.); STAFF OF UNIVERSITY OF IOWA, A CENTURY OF FARMING IN
IOWA, 1846-1946, at 347 (1946) (Gross farm income in Iowa dropped from $830 mil-
lion in 1929 to $317 million in 1932.). See generally G. FIRE, supra note 18, at 49
(describing "new and shocking levels of want and destitution beyond anything previ-
ously known").
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ture, beginning what one historian has called one of the largest migra-
tions in human history-the migration of Americans from country to
city.
2S
The suffering on America's farms was real; its portrayal in schol-
arly and popular literature shocked the country.2 Equally real was the
shock of recognition with which the nation began to understand that it
was no longer a nation of farmers. These personal-economic and na-
tional-cultural crises precipitated an intensely creative era in American
politics. Southern tenant farmers flirted with unionism;2 5 midwestern
farmers flirted with socialism.26 In the Congress, the farm problem oc-
's See J. SHOVER, supra note 18, at 6 (estimating that the farm population
dropped by 1.2 million between 1920 and 1930). Farm demography of the 1920's and
the Depression years is difficult to analyze. Demographers disagree about how to de-
fine the terms farm, farmer, urban, and rural. See, e.g., W. COCHRANE, supra note 20,
at 23-24 (distinguishing between commercial and residential farms); USDA, supra
note 19, at 46-50 (discussing various categories of farm). Thus, estimates vary with the
definitions used. More important, perhaps, large numbers of the urban unemployed
returned to the countryside during the Depression. See J. SHOVER, supra note 18, at 6.
Consequently, an unspectacular numerical decline masks the beginnings of one of the
largest population movements in human history. When World War II spurred eco-
nomic opportunities, farmers left the countryside in droves. See id. at 4. The proportion
of farmers in the population declined from about 25% in 1935 to about 15% in 1950.
See G. FITE, supra note 18, at 101. In all, at least thirty million people left the Ameri-
can countryside in the years between 1930 and 1970. See J. SHOVER, supra note 18,
at 4.
24 The literature is so vast as to defy fair summary. It is fair to say, however, that
it was during this time that America first realized that it had been fragmented into
separate rural and urban cultures, and that the rural poor belonged to a world so vastly
different from the world of the urban elite as to merit close artistic and scholarly atten-
tion. Among the better-known works of the era that have retained their power to shock
the reader are J. AGEE & W. EVANS, LET Us Now PRAISE FAMOUS MEN (1939)
(photodocumentary account of three Alabama tenant farm families); D. LANGE & P.
TAYLOR, AN AMERICAN ExoDus (1969) (collecting some of the best known of the five
hundred thousand photographs taken of rural Americans by Farm Security Adminis-
tration photographers); A. MACLEIsH, LAND OF THE FREE (1938) (vituperative poetic
account of environmental destruction during the Depression); J. STEINBECK, THE
GRAPES OF WRATH (1940).
25 See, e.g., D. GRUBBS, CRY FROM COTTON: THE SOUTHERN TENANT
FARMER'S UNION AND THE NEW DEAL (1971) (tracing the history and ultimate fail-
ure of Southern sharecroppers' unions during the 1930's); T. ROSENGARTEN, ALL
GOD'S DANGERS: THE LIFE OF NATE SHAW (1974) (oral biography of one leader of
the Alabama Sharecroppers' Union); Wise & Thrasher, The Southern Tenant Farm-
ers' Union, in WORKING LIVES: THE SOUTHERN EXPOSURE HISTORY OF LABOR IN
THE SOUTH 120, 120-42 (M. Miller ed. 1980) (presenting six first-person accounts of
the Southern Tenant Farmers' Union).
26 See, e.g., Dyson, The Farmer and the Left: The Influence of Radical Farm
Organizations, in FARMERS, BUREAUCRATS, AND MIDDLEMEN: HISTORICAL PER-
SPECTIVES ON AMERICAN AGRICULTURE 80-99 (T. Peterson ed. 1980) (describing the
success of the Socialist Party in rural America in the early twentieth century and of
"radical farm organizations" during the agricultural depression of the 1920's and
1930's); Saloutos & Hicks, The Farm Strike, in PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES IN
IOWA HISTORY 359 (D. Schwieder ed. 1973) (describing events in Iowa leading to the
[Vol. 134:657
IDEOLOGY OF HOOD V. DUMOND
cupied near-center stage throughout the 1920's,2" and in state houses
across the land, legislators grappled with the complex relationships
among economics, politics, and society as they attempted to respond to
crisis.
28
In coming to grips with the agricultural crisis of the Depression
years, legislators, economists, sociologists, and cultural critics began to
discern, if but vaguely, the large contours of the modern American
"farm problem." They realized that the distinctive characteristic of
American agriculture was its ability consistently to outproduce de-
mand.29  Thus, farm prices were low and farm incomes inade-
farm strike of 1931).
17 For succinct descriptions of the federal legislative response to the crisis of the
1920's, see G. FITE, supra note 18, at 41-48; L. TwEETEN, supra note 17, at 301. In
brief, five agricultural bills were introduced into Congress in 1924 and 1925, precipi-
tating five years of debate. See M. BENEDICT, supra note 19, at 212. Two McNary-
Haugen bills passed Congress, H.R. 12,687, S. 3555, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1928);
H.R. 15,474, S. 4808, 69th Cong., 2d Sess. (1927), only to be vetoed by President
Coolidge. See M. BENEDICT, supra note 19, at 227, 229. Finally, in 1929, Congress
passed and President Hoover signed into law the Agricultural Marketing Act, Pub. L.
No. 71-10, 46 Stat. 11 (1929) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.),
the first national legislative attempt to cure the persistent problems of farm surplus and
inadequate farm incomes. See G. FrrE, supra note 18, at 49. See generally M. BENE-
DICT, supra note 19, at 207-38 (analyzing in more detail federal farm policy debates of
the years 1924 to 1929); id. at 200 (describing the activities of the 1921 Congressional
Joint Commission of Agricultural Inquiry); id. at 239-40 (describing the operation of
the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1929).
28 There is no comprehensive scholarly survey of state responses to the Depres-
sion. Robert Ingalls does, however, provide a summary of the New Deal in New York.
See R. INGALLS, supra note 22. For Ingalls' description of New York's agricultural
legislation, see id; at 148-81. In the midwest, several states passed relief acts in re-
sponse to farm problems and farmer discontent. See, e.g., T. BLEGEN, MINNESOTA: A
HISTORY OF THE STATE 523-36 (1963) (recounting how the Farmer-Labor party
gained control of state government); J. MADISON, INDIANA THROUGH TRADITION
AND CHANGE: A HISTORY OF THE HOOSIER STATE AND ITS PEOPLE, 1920-1945, at
176 (1982) (describing the successful efforts of the Indiana Farm Bureau to change
property-tax laws); J. OLSON, A HISTORY OF NEBRASKA 296-97 (1966) (describing
the state legislature as unsuccessfully wrestling with the problems of the Depression in
early 1933); L. SAGE, A HISTORY OF IOWA 291-302 (1974) (tax relief measure in
Iowa). For a summary of state efforts to regulate the dairy industry, see J. BLACK,
THE DAIRY INDUSTRY AND THE AAA 311 (1935).
29 One agricultural historian describes "excess productive capacity" as a chronic
problem of agriculture in the years from 1939 to 1970. W. COCHRANE, supra note 18,
at 137-40; see also G. CRAMER & C. JENSEN, supra note 18, at 291-92 (discussing the
large economic impact of excess production); G. FrrE, supra note 18, at 73 ("Increased
farm output . . . posed a dangerous threat to the goals of price and income parity
established by New Deal planners and Congress [in the 1930's]."); L. TwEErEN,
supra note 17, at 155-56 (discussing the problem of excess capacity and estimating
excess at between five and ten percent of total production between 1956 and 1966);
Bitter Harvest, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 18, 1985, at 52, 56-58 (discussing the current over-
supply of many farm products).
Most twentieth-century agricultural policy can be understood as an attempt to
deal with the problem of excess capacity. See L. TwEETEN, supra note 17, at 155-56;
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quate.30 High labor costs coupled with low prices created strong incen-
tives to substitute capital for labor in farm production .3  Average rates
see also M. BENEDICT, supra note 19, at 302-15 (describing and analyzing the at-
tempts made in the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-10, 48 Stat.
31 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 601-624 (1982)), to reduce excess supply by
limiting acreages and raising exports); id. at 362 (setting forth the provisions of the
Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act of 1922, Pub. L. No. 75-210, 50 Stat. 522 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.), in which Congress sought to aid poor
farmers through government purchases of "sub-marginal lands"); W. COCHRANE,
supra note 18, at 288 (describing the acreage limitations in the Food and Agriculture
Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-321, 79 Stat. 1187 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
7 U.S.C.)); G. FITE, supra note 18, at 48 (describing the Agricultural Marketing Act
of 1929, Pub. L. No. 71-10, 46 Stat. 11 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.), as an attempt to control excess supply).
The principal device that government has used to try to limit production has been
a system of voluntary acreage limitations. In brief, farmers have been paid for not using
some of their land. See, e.g., M. BENEDICT, supra note 19, at 303-04, 375-78 (describ-
ing the acreage limitations of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-
10, 48 Stat. 31 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 601-624 (1982)), and the Agricul-
tural Adjustment Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-430, 52 Stat. 31 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.)). The system of voluntary acreage limitations, however,
has backfired dismally. Farmers have responded by retiring their worst land from pro-
duction and by increasing their use of fertilizer and the quality of their machinery
inputs. See, e.g., W. COCHRANE, supra note 18, at 128 table 7.1 (demonstrating that
while wheat yields increased about 25% between 1870 and 1950, they more than
doubled between 1950 and 1970); J. SCHLEBECKER, supra note 18, at 243 (noting that
wheat production increased between 1937 and 1944 even though wheat acreage was
reduced by 25% during that same period).
so "Low" is, of course, a relative term. Here and throughout this Comment,
"low" refers to prices that are too low to permit a number of farmers determined to be
culturally desirable to make a living from farming. See L. TwEETEN, supra note 17, at
155 (defining the related problem of excess capacity as the "surplus of production ca-
pacity over market utilization at socially acceptable prices"). Within these definitional
constraints, agricultural writers agree that farm prices have been low for most of the
last century. See, e.g., G. CRAMER & C. JENSEN, supra note 18, at 291 (Agricultural
prices and incomes have been relatively low in the twentieth century.); J. SHOVER,
supra note 18, at 7 (Farmers' per capita income is consistently lower than
nonfarmers'.); L. TWEETEN, supra note 17, at 163-65 (analyzing the problem of low
farm income).
31 See, e.g., W. COCHRANE, supra note 18, at 322-23 (describing the dramatic
change in agriculture between 1900 and 1975 that resulted from the substitution of
machines for expensive labor); see also id. at 205 table 10.2 (Labor as a proportion of
all farm inputs declined from 65% in 1870 to 16% in 1976.); G. FITE, supra note 18,
at 79 ("The substitution of capital for labor [between 1920 and 1940] was producing
much of the change on American farms.").
As these long-run analyses suggest, the process of capital substitution has its roots
in the nineteenth century. See, e.g., id. at 11-19 (describing nineteenth-century farm
life). The proportionately largest changes, however, have occurred in the past fifty
years. See, e.g., id. at 69-70 ("The most important development in American agricul-
ture in the 1920's and the 1930's was the gradual shift in some parts of the country
from horses and mules to tractor power."); J. SCHLEBECKER, supra note 18, at 252
table 22.1 (showing that as late as 1936 more than half of all farms used horsepower
exclusively); see also W. COCHRANE, supra note 18, at 130 table 7.2 (Purchased farm
inputs more than doubled in constant dollars between 1934 and 1970.); id. at 128 table
7.1 (The largest proportional increase in wheat and corn yields between 1870 and 1970
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of profit per unit of input declined steadily, 2 creating additional incen-
tives to increase both the size and intensity of farming operations. In
short, American farming was an intensely and endemically competitive
business, characterized by low and declining profitability. And declin-
ing profitability was steadily driving farmers out of business.
A detached observer might have regarded the steady decline in the
farm population as the necessary result of the social and economic or-
ganization of American life, but such an observer could rarely be found.
Farmers occupied a special place in American history and in the Amer-
ican imagination; farmers were perceived as a distinct social group, not
merely as laborers."3 To policymakers, whose perceptions were con-
strained by a set of cultural assumptions about the farmers' role in
American society, inadequate farm incomes became a problem to be
remedied, not an incentive for farmers to change jobs. "
occurred during the last 20 years of that period.); id. at"132 (The number of farms
declined by 55% between 1935 and 1970.); id. at 134 (describing changes in the struc-
ture of the farm between 1933 and 1970 as "radical"); J. SHOVER, supra note 18, at
115 (arguing that farming in 1920 was probably more like it was in 1720 than it was
in 1970).
2 See P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 21-25 (11th ed. 1980) (orthodox
microeconomic presentation of declining marginal returns); Goss, Rodefeld & Buttel,
The Political Economy of Class Structure in U.S. Agriculture: A Theoretical Outline,
in TiE RURAL SOCIOLOGY OF THE ADVANCED SOCIETIEs 83, 88 (1980) (summarizing
Marx's formulation of the tendency of the average rate of profit to decline with the
substitution of capital for labor). In practical terms, the immediate effect of the declin-
ing rate of profit is that the product of an acre of land and one person's labor will buy
relatively less over time. In consequence, access to capital for the purchase of land and
technology becomes a critical determinant of farm survival. See, e.g., W. COCHRANE,
supra note 18, at 133, 352 (Only the technological vanguard of farmers has profited in
the mid-twentieth century.). Owners of larger farms have considerable advantages in
obtaining credit and federal aid, and they are likely to have better access to information.
See Bitter Harvest, supra note 29, at 56. But cf. Easterbrook, Making Sense of Agri-
culture, ATL. MONTHLY, July 1985, at 63, 64 (Smaller farms are more likely to be
enrolled in federal subsidy programs than large farms.). More important, perhaps, the
development of agricultural technology has vastly transformed the culture of agricul-
ture, and it is difficult to argue that the modern farm-community region, with its vast
and widely separated farms, bears any close sociological resemblance to the rural com-
munities of even the recent past. See infra notes 65, 158-59 and accompanying text.
33 See G. FITE, supra note 18, at 130 ("The prospect of a continuing decline in
the number of family farms struck at some very deeply held American emotions and
beliefs. Indeed, the family farm was at the center of the agrarian tradition, which
claimed that agriculture provided a superior way of life . . ").
-1 See id. at 122-23 ("Most Americans, however, did not favor government poli-
cies that would accelerate the decline of the farm population. Such a policy ran counter
to the deep feelings held by many people that there was something good about life on
the land, both for individuals and for the nation."); id. at 131 (describing bipartisan
support in the 1940's and 1950's for treating the family farm as a cultural artifact).
One might of course argue that the number of farmers should be determined by
market forces. See, e.g., id. at 76 (discussing the increasing national awareness in the
1940's that there was a surplus farm population and that traditional ideals of the role
of farmers in American society might have to change); id. at 166-67 (describing the
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These assumptions were embedded in the ancient rhetoric of the
independent yeoman, which equated personal and civic virtue with per-
sonal independence and land ownership, and the strength of the nation
and the vitality of democratic processes with the size and strength of the
independent farm population. 5 Moreover, large numbers of Americans
were but one generation from the land, and their understanding of
proper social organization was still a product of rural culture. 8
This complex of perceptions represented a substantial commitment
to the Jeffersonian ideal of a nation of small-scale communities-based
on the wide distribution of land and characterized by participatory de-
mocracy-and to the proposition that America should continue to pro-
vide room for a substantial and vigorous farm population.17 In the ser-
farm interests' enormous cry of opposition following a 1962 study by the Committee for
Economic Development that recommended policies that would reduce the number of
farmers); P. SAMUELSON, supra note 32, at 384 (describing the problem of agriculture
as a problem of surplus population); Easterbrook, supra note 32, at 78 ("Eventually
Congress will have to face the fact that there are too many farmers.").
This argument, however, has rarely been made. For almost six decades since Pres-
ident Coolidge's veto of the McNary-Haugen Bills in 1927 and 1928, see supra note
27, national farm policy has been based in part on the assumption that the market does
not produce as many farmers as the culture as a whole desires. See W. COCHRANE,
supra note 18, at 290-92.
35 A full examination of the effect on farm policy of the notion that America is
and ought to be a nation of farmers is beyond the scope of this Comment. Raymond
Williams has observed that the concept of an ideal, but now vanished, rural past is
frequently used as the basis for critiques of modernism and that such critiques have
placed the decisive point of the disappearance of this ideal in every century since the
sixteenth. See R. WILLIAMS, THE COUNTRY AND THE CITY 35-36, 290-91 (1973). By
focusing on the process by which the Hood Court's rhetoric was formed, this Comment
seeks to avoid the romantic fallacy, identified by Williams, of uncritically preferring the
past to the present. Although the Comment is informed by the notion that the ideal of
Jeffersonian agrarianism, see infra note 37, may be preferable to the ideal of economic
growth, it makes no claim that the world left behind by Hood was a better world than
that presaged by Hood. The claim, rather, is that the transition from one world to the
other was one of profound significance.
3" See supra note 23 and accompanying text; see also K. BARRY, THEME
SONG-1936: GIVE Us BACK OUR INDEPENDENCE 15 (1936) ("The American
Revolution was a triumph of farmers . . . ."); E. BENSON, FREEDOM TO FARM 109
(1960) ("[The country] is a good place to teach the basic virtues that have helped to
build this nation."); BUSINESSMAN'S COMMISSION ON AGRICULTURE, THE CONDITION
OF AGRICULTURE IN THE UNITED STATES AND MEASURES FOR ITS IMPROVEMENT 18
(1927) ("[The farmer's] is a proud heritage."); G. FITE, supra note 18, at 18 (" 'The
farmer represents a peculiarly high type of American citizenship.' ") (quoting Theodore
Roosevelt); T. JEFFERSON, Notes on the State of Virginia, in THOMAS JEFFERSON:
WRITINGS 290 (M. Peterson ed. 1984) ("Those who labour in the earth are the chosen
people of God . . . ."); J. SHOVER, supra note 18, at 12 (describing a public opinion
poll taken in the mid-1950's showing that farm life represented the ideal of a majority
of Americans).
" Throughout this Comment, the term "Jeffersonian ideal" stands for the notion
of relatively small-scale, participatory democracy based on the relatively wide distribu-
tion of landed property. While such usage does not pretend to be a full or accurate
portrayal of Jefferson's ideal, it is thoroughly grounded in Jefferson's thought. See, e.g.,
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vice of this ideal, Depression-era legislators sought to design programs
that would redress inadequate farm incomes, keep farmers in business,
and allow rural culture to survive.
B. Section 258-c of Article 21
Article 21 of the New York Agriculture and Markets Law"8 was a
local response to the acute crisis that the Depression precipitated in
New York dairy farming." By the spring of 1932, it was obvious that
the federal Agriculture Marketing Act of 1929 had failed to relieve
farmers of the burden of the Depression.40 In New York, the nation's
second largest producer of milk products, many farmers neared ruin as
dairy prices plummeted faster than other farm prices.
4 1
In March of 1932 the New York Legislature created a special
joint committee to investigate the causes of the decline of the price of
milk.4 2 After hearings that lasted nearly a year and produced more
than 2000 pages of testimony, the committee' concluded that an acute
emergency existed in the state dairy industry and that this emergency
threatened the health of the inhabitants, the survival of the farm popu-
lation, and the economic stability of the state and its local govern-
ments.4 In response, the legislature enacted article 21, an omnibus
A. KOCH, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 164-65 (1957) (describing Jef-
ferson's belief in the necessity that republics be small); id. at 172-73 (comparing Jeffer-
son's love for agriculture with his distrust of manufacturing); C. WILTSE, THE JEFFER-
SONIAN TRADITION IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 137-38 (1935) (describing Jefferson's
view that unequal division of property should be minimized); id. at 147 ("[Jefferson]
felt unmistakably the unrest and uneasiness preceding the birth pangs of a capitalistic
industrialism. . . . His ideal would have been a society built upon...
landowners . . ").
38 Act of Mar. 30, 1934, ch. 126, 1934 N.Y. Laws 564 (codified as amended at
N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW §§ 252 to 258-r (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1985)).
39 See R. INGALLS, supra note 22, at 152-52 (summarizing the effects of the De-
pression, with particular reference to the New York dairy industry). In brief, local
dairy prices held up well through the 1920's and into the first years of the Depression.
By 1934, however, New York milk prices had fallen by more than 50% to levels 34%
below the general price level. In March 1933, dairy farmers struck. In August, they
rioted. See id. at 151, 155; see also G. FITE, supra note 18, at 49 (providing a short,
readable history of some of the effects of the Depression by summarizing and ex-
cerpting from the letters of farmers).
40 See G. FITE, supra note 18, at 48 (discussing the Agriculture Marketing Act of
1929, Pub. L. No. 71-10, 46 Stat. 11 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.)). See generally M. BENEDICT, supra note 19, at 247-67 (discussing the effect
of the Depression on agriculture and attempts to alleviate it).
41 See R. INGALLS, supra note 22, at 151; see also USDA, AGRICULTURAL STA-
TISTICS 1946, at 388 table 505 (showing that New York ranked second nationally in
gross dollar value of dairy products).
42 See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 516 (1934); R. INGALLS, supra note
22, at 151-52 (summarizing the formation of the joint committee and its work).
43 See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 516 (1934); see also id. at 518 n.2
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milk control act, and article 21A, an emergency price control act.44
In their first forms, articles 21 and 21A empowered the State
Commissioner of Agriculture to set farm production quotas,45 minimum
prices for farm products,4" minimum and maximum retail prices,47 and
minimum and maximum charges for the handling and processing of
milk and milk products.48 Together, these sweeping powers allowed the
Commissioner to control both the costs and revenues of milk producers
and processors and, therefore, to control the structure of New York
dairying and milk marketing.
4
(setting forth provisions of the Act of Apr. 10, 1933, ch. 158, § 300, 1933 N.Y. Laws
558, 559, repealed by Act of May 7, 1934, ch. 319, 1934 N.Y. Laws 849).
44 In 1933, the New York Legislature enacted article 25. Act of Apr. 10, 1933, ch.
158, 1933 N.Y. Laws 558, repealed by Act of May 7, 1934, ch. 319, 1934 N.Y. Laws
849. This was a one-year emergency measure that controlled entirely the production,
distribution, and sale of milk products. When article 25 expired, it was replaced by
articles 21 and 21A. Act of Mar. 30, 1934, ch. 126, 1934 N.Y. Laws 564 (codified as
amended at N.Y AGRIC. & MKTs. LAW § 252 to 258-r (McKinney 1972 & Supp.
1985)); see also R. INGALLS, supra note 22, at 152-54, 158-59 (tracing the history of
the New York legislation).
"5 Act of Mar. 30, 1934, ch. 126, § 258-m(1)(a), 1934 N.Y. Laws 564, 575-76,
repealed by Act of June 3, 1937, ch. 876, 1937 N.Y. Laws 1977.
46 Id.
47 Id. § 258-m(1)(b), 1934 N.Y. Laws at 575-76, repealed by Act of June 3,
1977, ch. 876, 1937 N.Y. Laws 1977.
48 Id. § 258-m(1)(c), 1934 N.Y. Laws at 575-76, repealed by Act of June 3,
1937, ch. 876, 1937 N.Y. Laws 1977.
41 The power to set minimum prices allowed the Commissioner to determine the
costs that a farm could incur without going out of business. At any price, the last
surviving farm will be that farm whose average per unit costs are equal to its average
per unit returns. See G. CRAMER & C. JENSEN, supra note -18, at 143-45 & figures 6-
4, 6-5, 6-6 (illustrating and discussing the basic relationship between costs, prices, and
profits). In other words, no business can long survive if its per unit costs of production
exceed the selling price of the relevant unit. Thus, the minimum price determines the
maximum cost that an ongoing business will be able to incur. See id. at 297 figure 12-4
(illustrating the economic effect of maintaining price levels above the equilibrium
price).
In theory, a system of minimum prices might be used to influence the development
of rural culture. With perfect information, the body entrusted with setting the mini-
mum could ascertain the culturally desirable number of farmers and the per unit costs
of that number's least efficient producer. The minimum price would then be set equal
to these costs. As minimum prices have historically been set, however, their effectiveness
in preserving small farms has been far more modest in practice than it might have been
in theory. There are a number of reasons for this limited effectiveness. First, minimum
prices have usually been set at a level below the producers' median operating cost. See
M. BENEDICT, supra note 19, at 450, 455-57; L. TWEETEN, supra note 17, at 304.
Thus, half or more of all producers, including many small farmers, have been unable to
cover their costs when selling at the minimum price level. Second, legislators and ad-
ministrators apparently have never attempted to reach agreement on the culturally de-
sirable number of farmers. Rather, minimum prices have usually been tied to the aver-
age price of agricultural commodities during the preceding 36-month period. See L.
TWEETEN, supra note 17, at 309; USDA, supra note 20, at 58-60. Third, any benefits
that do result from minimum prices may be capitalized in land values. See W. COCH-
RANE, supra note 18, at 394; G. CRAMER & C. JENSEN, supra note 18, at 303.
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At its inception, then, article 21 was grounded in the recognition
that only full control over production, processing, and distribution al-
lowed control over the organization of agriculture.50 In the decade
Finally, while minimum prices may have aided some farmers, the farmers most in
need of assistance-those operating small farms-have benefitted least from these pro-
grams. Minimum prices have generally been supported either by payments to produc-
ers for not producing a particular crop or by government purchases of surplus commod-
ities. See M. BENEDICT, supra note 19, at 276, 303; see also supra note 29 (discussing
the use of voluntary acreage limitations). Neither of these forms of price support has
been limited to smaller farmers. See USDA, supra note 20, at 102, 116. In general,
small farmers cannot take advantage of developments in agricultural technology as rap-
idly as their larger competitors. As a result, the substantial improvements in farm tech-
nology that have taken place in the twentieth century may have lowered average oper-
ating costs in the industry while improving relatively little the position of small
farmers. To the extent that average industry costs are used in setting minimum prices,
technological development actually may have exacerbated the plight of the small
farmer. In any event, the largest farmers have generally captured the largest portion of
price supports, and some economists have argued that only relatively large farmers have
been helped by minimum prices. See J. SHOVER, supra note 18, at 177; L. TWEErEN,
supra note 17, at 318 table 10.4.
Minimum prices may have smoothed out some swings in commodity prices, kept
some farmers in business who otherwise would have failed, and eased the transition of
farmers out of agriculture. See W. COCHRANE, supra note 18, at 384; G. CRAMER &
C. JENSEN, supra note 18, at 304. But they have failed to halt the prevailing trend
toward increasing concentration of farm ownership. See infra text accompanying notes
56-58. Given these limitations, the quota provisions of section 258 were an important
complement to its minimum price provisions. The imposition of a quota would have
prevented the generation of huge farm surpluses. More important, in the technological
environment of the twentieth century, the judicious use of different price levels for sur-
plus and quota products would have affected the nature of technological change. By
setting lower prices for surplus milk, the Commissioner of Agriculture could have pre-
vented farmers from adopting technology that would increase output and channel tech-
nological innovation toward producing the same volume of output more cheaply. For
the reasons more particularly detailed in the preceding paragraphs, the absence of such
quota provisions has fatally hampered the effectiveness of most mid-twentieth-century
agricultural legislation.
50 What is quite remarkable about articles 21 and 21A is that they permitted the
Commissioner of Agriculture to control every relevant variable in the production, distri-
bution, and sale of agricultural commodities. In short, with adequate information, they
could have worked. They present clearly, therefore, the essential conundrum of the
"farm problem": namely, that if we want to preserve a substantial number of small
farmers, then we must have a managed and planned economy. We cannot equitably
limit farms' production without also limiting other economic activity. In the absence of
such limits, the structure of the market operates ineluctably to diminish the number of
farmers each year. See G. FrrE, supra note 18, at 77 ("To have changed or retarded
the course of American farming . . . on the eve of World War II . . . would have
meant substituting elaborate government planning [for] advancing agricultural technol-
ogy and organization, and private choice, that would have been totally unacceptable to
a majority of farmers or other Americans.").
The Commissioner held similar power over processors and handlers. The power to
set minimum milk prices to be paid to producers allowed the Commissioner to control
directly the variable cost of milk processors. As discussed below, see infra notes 59-60
and accompanying text, the licensing provisions of section 258 allowed the Commis-
sioner to control both fixed costs and the rate of technological change. The power to
control retail prices coupled with the power to set the price paid to producers enabled
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before Hood, however, article 21 was substantially weakened. The pro-
visions permitting the Commissioner to set farm quotas and retail
prices were allowed to lapse.5" Of the Act's major original provisions,
only those permitting the establishment of minimum milk prices and
the licensing of milk dealers were retained. 52 The revised Act gave the
Commissioner some control over farm incomes and the rate of farm
failures and considerable control over the organization and structure of
the milk processing business, but in the absence of direct power over
farm production and producer revenues, the state exercised considera-
bly less control than it once had over the direction of agricultural
change. 3
Federal law did not remedy these deficiencies. At the time of
Hood's suit, federal agricultural law permitted the government to set
minimum milk prices and to support prices by purchasing surplus
milk54 but permitted production controls only in exceptional circum-
stances. 55 Unlike article 21, federal law contained no provisions for
the Commissioner to control revenues. These powers interacted with the quota powers
and the power to set transportation costs to give the Commissioner control over every
variable affecting the milk processing industry: fixed costs, variable costs, rates of capi-
tal substitution, revenues, and distribution costs. See G. CRAMER & C. JENSEN, supra
note 18, at 147 (modeling graphically all variables affecting agricultural firms' output).
5' The provisions allowing the Commissioner to set production quotas and retail
prices were allowed to lapse for good in 1937. See R. INGALLS, supra note 22, at 170
(discussing Act of June 3, 1937, ch. 876, 1937 N.Y. Laws 1977 (codified as amended at
N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 258-m (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1985))). Ingalls
traces the erratic history of the lapsing and reinstituting of New York milk control laws
in the period from 1934 to 1937 and presents a short discussion of some of the contro-
versy that surrounded these laws. See id. at 148-72.
52 See Act of June 3, 1937, ch. 876, 1937 N.Y. Laws 1977 (codified as amended
at N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 258-m (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1985)).
" For a discussion of the effect of deleting quota provisions from New York's
milk control laws, see R. INGALLS, supra note 22, at 170-72. See also supra note 49.
The removal of the power to set retail prices shifted control over producer revenues to
the market, but the revised law still provided a substantial measure of control over
processors and distributors. See infra text accompanying note 59.
" See Act of Aug. 24, 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-320, § 8c(5), 49 Stat. 750, 754-55
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 608c(5) (1982)); Act of June 3, 1937, Pub. L. No.
75-137, § 2(Q, 50 Stat. 246, 247 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 608c(18) (1982));
see also HOUSE COMM. ON AGRICULTURE, AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT ACT
AMENDMENTS, H.R. REP. No. 1241, 74th Cong., 1st. Sess. 9-11 (1935) (discussing
rationale for and means of fixing milk prices).
55 Agricultural legislation of the 1930's provided for two different kinds of pro-
duction controls. First, farm subsidy payments were linked to the voluntary curtailment
of acreage. See Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-10, § 8, 48 Stat.
31, 34 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 608 (1982)); see M. BENEDICT, supra note
19, at 375; W. COCHRANE, supra note 18, at 142-43; J. SCHLEBECKER, supra note 18,
at 242-43. As discussed above, this approach failed to reduce production because farm-
ers responded by taking their least productive lands out of production and increasing
the intensity of their farming operations on the remaining lands, thereby increasing
their output while receiving subsidies for taking land out of production. See supra note
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controlling distribution processes.
The minimum-price and government-purchase provisions of state
29. Second, the Secretary of Agriculture was authorized to impose marketing quotas if
he found that production of a particular commodity was excessive and if two-thirds of
the producers of that commodity agreed to the imposition of the quota. See Act of Aug.
24, 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-320, § 8c(9), 49 Stat. 750, 758 (codified as amended at 7
U.S.C. § 608c(9) (1982)). Although theoretically this power was considerable, it ap-
parently was never exercised. See M. BENEDICT, supra note 19, at 376-77; G. FITE,
supra note 17, at 60.
The beginning of the Second World War complicated the relatively simple picture
presented above. In 1941, in response to wartime demand, national policymakers aban-
doned their unsuccessful attempts to restrict agricultural production and instead at-
tempted to increase it. See M. BENEDICT, supra note 19, at 402-03. This latter pro-
gram was hugely successful. See id. at 441 table 2 (showing farm production increases
from 1939 to 1945); W. COCHRANE, supra note 18, at 137 (stating that the increase of
25% in farming output in the 1940's was the largest in the twentieth century). Farm
prices also rose dramatically during this period. See id. at 123 figure 7.1 (indexes of
farm prices and net farm income, 1910-1977).
As the war neared an end, however, the prospect of huge surpluses loomed. See,
e.g., G. FITE, supra note 18, at 89. Although European and domestic demand kept
prices high until early 1948, prices began to fall rapidly thereafter. See M. BENEDICT,
supra note 19, at 463; G. FITE, supra note 18, at 87-89. In 1948, however, farm
income dropped 15%, and surpluses mounted. See R. CHRISTENSON, THE BRANNAN
PLAN: FARM POLITICS AND POLICY 18 (1959); G. FrrE, supra note 18, at 98-99. In
1953 and 1954, another recession precipitated another dismal decade for farmers. See
G. FITE, supra note 18, at 107 (Agricultural prices dropped 23% between 1951 and
1956.).
As the following table indicates, New York milk prices followed this national pat-
tern closely.
NEW YORK MILK PRICES, 1940 TO 1953
Year Raw Price Price Adjusted
per 100 Lbs.a for Inflationb
1940 2.15 5.00
1941 - -
1942 2.91 5.38
1943 2.91 5.15
1944 3.56 6.25
1945 3.53 6.10
1946 4.42 6.68
1947 4.70 5.79
1948 5.35 6.06
1949 4.32 5.17
1950 4.15 4.78
1951 4.75 4.89
1952 - -
1953 4.40 4.70
Sources: BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 1963, at 351 table 468 (chart showing wholesale prices for 1940 to 1962);
USDA, AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS 1940-1953 (tables on dairy farm products).
aData for 1941 and 1952 were not available.
bBase years: 1957-1959.
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and federal law protected farmers against the most extreme swings in
the volatile commodities markets and, therefore, against short-term
losses.56 Under the conditions that have obtained in American agricul-
ture in the twentieth century, however, minimum prices have had rela-
tively little effect on the structure of agricultural development. 57 As the
decline in the number of farms, from 6.5 million to 2.4 million between
1920 and 1980, and the increase in average farm size, from 140 acres
to 400 acres in these same years, vividly illustrate,58 minimum prices
have affected the rate of agricultural change only slightly and the direc-
tion not at all.
The licensing provisions of section 258-c of article 21 provided a
small but significant check on the forces leading to decreases in the
farm population and increases in farm size and the intensity of farm
use. These provisions allowed the Commissioner of Agriculture to con-
trol the size of processing operations and thereby to control the reve-
nues of processors.59 When prices were near the minimum, the Com-
missioner also had a measure of control over processors' variable costs.
Together these powers gave the state considerable power over the prof-
itability of processing, and thus some effective control over the structure
of the industry. Similarly, section 258-c allowed the Commissioner,
within the constraints set by the aggregate demand for milk products, to
determine the number and size of potential buyers of milk products
and, therefore, to affect farmers' ability to participate in milk market-
ing.8 0 Finally, by determining the profitability of milk processing and
58 This assumes, of course, that the minimum price is not allowed to float down-
ward with the equilibrium price. On the characteristic volatility of the commodities
markets, see G. CRAMER & C. JENSEN, supra note 18, at 292 (discussing the relatively
low elasticity of demand for farm products). See also id. at 292-93 (discussing varia-
tions in supplies of commodities and twentieth-century government policies for reducing
price swings). For other discussions of the volatility of farm prices, see W. COCHRANE,
supra note 19, at 33-59; P. SAMUELSON, supra note 32, at 387; L. TWEETEN, supra
note 17, at 153.
, See supra note 49.
58 See G. FrrE, supra note 18, at 101; J. SHOVER, supra note 18, at 6; USDA,
supra note 20, at 42 figure 5.
5' The Commissioner was able to control substantial technological change and ex-
pansion of size through section 258-c, which required the Commissioner's approval for
any substantial modification or expansion of facilities. Processors might have tried to
achieve savings in the cost of collecting milk by paying a premium for bulk purchases
from large producers. The economic difficulties of the industry, however, limited the
processors' ability to pay the higher prices. With demand usually lagging behind sup-
ply in the local milk industry, the retail margin would not encourage the payment of
bonuses to large producers.
80 Given the long-run tendency of technological change in twentieth-century
America to increase the ratio of capital to labor in production, it seems likely that any
expansion of a plant would have increased the capital intensity of the milk processing
industry. In New York, the licensing provisions of section 258-c allowed the Commis-
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the organization of milk buying, the Commissioner could indirectly af-
fect the prices paid to farmers.
Section 258 reflects the accurate perception that control of market
processes is as critical as control of production to the organization of
agriculture. 1 The high fixed costs of agriculture, the historical tenden-
cies to overproduce, and declining per unit farm profits give the agri-
cultural purchaser considerable leverage in negotiating prices. Farmers
have few self-help remedies against purchasers. They are far from mar-
kets and dispersed from each other. Few have the capital or informa-
tional resources to market directly their products. As a result, purchas-
ers have been able to keep prices low, and farmers have been unable to
capture the profits of distribution and processing. 2 Since 1950, the
farmers' disadvantages have been exacerbated by increases in the size
of, and decreases in the number of, food processors and distributors, so
that today the largest part of the food dollar is captured by a few
processors and distributors.6 3 In consequence, individual farmers are
sioner to control the rate of expansion and thus to influence the capital and managerial
requirements for entering the processing business. It is reasonable to assume that farm-
ers as a group would have been less able than large, specialized dairy firms to obtain
the financing needed for constructing or purchasing milk processing facilities. It seems
equally reasonable to assume that the greater the scale of operations needed for efficient
milk processing, the less likely it would be that farmers would have the managerial
skills and experience needed for competing successfully with established firms. See, e.g.,
T. FREY & T. BEHRENS, LENDING TO AGRICULTURAL ENTERPRISES 33-34, 56-58
(focusing on the characteristics of the farmer as a borrower).
8" This was the point of section 258. A hypothetically omniscient Commissioner of
Agriculture would have been able to manipulate prices, costs, and technology to strike
the culturally desired optimum balance between retail milk prices and the number of
milk producers. The decision to deny Hood a license to build a new processing plant
was an attempt to strike exactly this balance. See infra text accompanying note 72.
Whether the Commissioner had the knowledge necessary to strike the balance in this or
any other case is beyond the scope of this Comment.
62 These observations summarize a substantial but scattered literature. See, e.g.,
W. COCHRANE, supra note 18, at 292 (discussing the atomistic structure of farm mar-
kets); W. COCHRANE, supra note 19, at 29-30 (The volatility of agricultural prices
places farmers in the position of having to minimize losses.); J. SCHLEBECKER, supra
note 18, at 293 (discussing the power of supermarket chains); J. SHOVER, supra note
18, at 176 ("Family farmers . . . are scarcely involved at all in the modern marketing
process . . ... "). Farmers, of course, have long felt that agricultural middlemen make
exorbitant profits. See, e.g., J. HicKs, supra note 18, at 74-81 (detailing some of farm-
ers' objections to middlemen in the late nineteenth century); J. SCHLEBECKER, supra
note 18, at 162 (Farmers in the mid-nineteenth century "often felt that middlemen
made exorbitant profits.").
63 For recent developments, see J. SCHLEBECKER, supra note 18, at 293 (The
supermarket share of the food retailing business increased from 20% to 52% between
1957 and 1969.); J. SHOVER, supra note 18, at 177 (noting that total marketing costs
absorb two-thirds of every dollar spent on food); L. TWEETEN, supra note 17, at 207
table 7.7 (illustrating for the period from 1947 to 1965 the steadily declining share of
retail food prices accruing to farmers); USDA, supra note 20, at 61-65 (discussing
concentration in the food industry and finding that the 50 largest food manufacturers
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confronted with few choices among purchasers, and a small number of
nationally organized food processors exert tremendous leverage on farm
prices. To the extent that it impeded such concentrations of power, sec-
tion 258-c was a potentially significant check on the forces leading to
the transformation of agriculture.
That the power of section 258-c was less than that of the original
articles 21 and 21A, or that section 258-c might have been less success-
ful in practice than it was in theory, is irrelevant for present purposes,
for the Supreme Court did not invalidate section 258-c because its pro-
visions were too weak." What is relevant is the underlying theory of
section 258-c: that if the social goal of preserving rural culture is to be
achieved, farmers must be protected against the operation of the mod-
ern American agricultural market, and that to achieve this goal the
structure of that market must be controlled.
The structural control of market organization is critical if the ob-
ject is to preserve a particular regional rural economy and society. The
development of modern capitalism has been marked by the increasing
regional specialization of agriculture.65 Middlemen, such as Hood, have
controlled 74% of total national food processing capabilities in 1978).
The food processing industry approaches a monopsony. See, e.g., G. CRAMER &
C. JENSEN, supra note 18, at 191-92; J. SHOVER, supra note 18, at 178-89; L.
TWEETEN, supra note 17, at 182-90. The essential characteristic of a monopsony is
that the individual buyer is so dominant in the market that it can set its purchase price.
In this situation, the profit-maximizing monopsonist does not permit the price to rise to
the competitive equilibrium, the point at which its marginal revenue product equals the
sellers' marginal cost. Rather, the monopsonist sets the quantity at a point where its
marginal revenue product equals its own marginal cost and establishes the purchase
price corresponding to that quantity on the market supply curve. See, e.g., R. POSNER,
supra note 12, at 230-31 (illustrating the profit-maximizing point for a monopsonist);
J. ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION 218-28 (2d ed. 1969)
(describing the economic principles of monopsony). The practical consequence is that a
monopsonist maximizes profits by paying less and buying less than it would in a com-
petitive market. Hood's application for a license to build a new processing plant was
disallowed by the Commissioner exactly because he feared that Hood would achieve a
monopsony in the Albany-Troy milkshed. See infra notes 70-87 and accompanying
text.
See infra text accompanying notes 93-95.
Compare D. RUTMAN, THE HUSBANDMEN OF PLYMOUTH 43-48 (1972)
(describing the varied output of Plymouth colony farms in the 1640's and 1650's) and
J. LEMON, THE BEST POOR MAN'S COUNTRY: A GEOGRAPHICAL STUDY OF EARLY
SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA 150-51 (1972) (describing generally the mixed charac-
ter of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century agriculture) with L. HAYSTEAD & G. FITE,
THE AGRICULTURAL REGIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 7 map 7 (1963) (dividing the
United States into 11 basic farming areas based on the proportion of farm revenues
attributable to different crops) and D. WORSTER, DUST BOWL: THE SOUTHERN
PLAINS IN THE 1930's 150-54 (1979) (describing the specialized methods of wheat
production used in Kansas during the 1930's). For a brilliant theoretical study of some
of the economic causes of regional agriculture in the first phase of the modern era, see
I. WALLERSTEIN, THE MODERN WORLD SYSTEM I: CAPITALIST AGRICULTURE AND
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played a crucial role in this process of regional differentiation. By cap-
turing the differences between the costs of the production and distribu-
tion of a commodity and the price of that commodity in a market, mid-
dlemen have profited and created capital. 6 To exploit fully differences
among farms and farming regions in marginal costs of production, the
middlemen have steadily expanded their markets.67 As the middlemen's
markets have expanded, agricultural regions have increasingly special-
ized in producing those commodities in which they have a comparative
advantage.
Unless it furthers their interest in purchasing commodities at the
lowest price, middlemen have no interest in the survival of any particu-
lar farm or farming region. Had milk been cheaper elsewhere, for ex-
ample, Hood might well have reduced its offering price or level of
purchases in the Albany-Troy milkshed, increasing competition among
farmers and precipitating the consolidation of many farms into a few.
In an extreme case, Hood's practices might have virtually eliminated
dairy farming in the region. In either event, local society and culture
would have been vastly altered or destroyed. Like any culture, rural
culture is a distinctive social formation, dependent for its local forms on
the particular organization of the local economy.
The observation that the social morphology"8 of a particular rural
THE ORIGINS OF THE EUROPEAN WORLD-ECONOMY IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY
63 (1974).
6 See USDA, supra note 20, at 61-65; see also G. CRAMER & C. JENSEN, supra
note 18, at 209-10 (describing different classifications of middlemen). Barry Hindess
and Paul Hirst, among others, have argued that the circulation of commodities is the
very essence of capitalism. See B. HINDESS & P. HIRST, PRE-CAPIrrALIST MODES OF
PRODUCTION 270, 304 (1975). For textbook accounts of the critically important role of
trade in the early development of capitalism, see D. DOWD, supra note 7, at 210-11; R.
EDWARDS, M. REICH & T. WEISSxOPF, supra note 7, at 63.
87 Expanding the market area brings each farm into competition with more farms,
increasing marginal differences in individual and regional productivity. For a discussion
of the process of regionalization in dairy farming, see J. SCHLEBECKER, supra note 18,
at 185. See also USDA, supra note 20, at 61-65 (arguing that concentration in the food
industry increases tendencies toward regionalism).
"' The term "social morphology" refers broadly to the combination of economic
and social structures that together make up what we speak of colloquially as the social
fabric. See, e.g., E. HOBSBAWM, INTRODUCTION TO K. MARX: PRE-CAPITALIST ECO-
NOMIC FORMATIONS 9-65 (1977) (summarizing Marx's attempt to analyze, as insepa-
rable, social and economic relations of production). For one of the best studies of the
relationship between economic and social structures, see W. GOLDScHMIDT, As YOU
Sow (1947), a comparative study of large-farm and small-farm California communi-
ties. Goldschmidt found that small-farm communities have more voluntary organiza-
tions-churches, schools, and clubs-than do large-farm communities. See id. at 101-
17, 195-97, 210-12. These findings have been replicated repeatedly, and there is a
considerable and growing literature that confirms what is intuitively obvious: namely,
that industrial and rural communities have little in common. See, e.g., Poole, Farm
Scale, Family Life, and Community Participation, 46 RURAL SOC. 112, 121-22
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region is a function of the organization of agricultural production is
particularly relevant to the cultural issue that was presented to the
Court in Hood. Although New York milk prices had recovered from
their Depression-era lows during the Second World War and had ad-
vanced rapidly in the years immediately after the War, by the time
Hood was decided signs of trouble were at hand in rural New York.
Small farms were failing; large farms were rapidly growing larger and
becoming more heavily capitalized. 9 If traditional rural culture were to
survive in the region, some control of the organization of the market
was essential.
In sum, article 21 was a piece of social legislation that was based
on an accurate perception of the contemporary agricultural economy
and designed to preserve farm communities. Section 258-c was applied
by the New York Commissioner to protect a community from manipu-
lation by outside capital at a time when the future of that community
was severely threatened by the changing organization of agriculture.
II. THE Hood OPINIONS
A. The Commissioner's Decision
The Hood suit began in March 1946, when H.P. Hood & Sons, a
large Boston dairy, applied to the New York Commissioner of Agricul-
ture and Markets for a license to build its third milk processing plant
at Greenwich, New York, in the Albany-Troy milkshed.7 0 Hood's pri-
mary stated reason for applying was that its two existing plants were
incapable of processing milk quickly enough during the "flush season"
to permit delivery in Boston by the 9:00 A.M. deadline required by local
health codes." The Commissioner of Agriculture denied the application
under section 258-c of article 21, on the grounds that construction of
the new plant would "tend to a destructive competition in a market
already adequately served" by Hood and other milk processors.2
(1981); Warner, Rural Society in a Post-Industrial Age, 39 RURAL Soc. 306, 315
(1974).
:9 The number of New York farms selling milk declined from 83,891 to 62,522
between 1930 and 1949. See L. HAYSTEAD & G. FIrE, supra note 65, at 54. For a
parallel situation, see H. SCHMIDT, AGRICULTURE IN NEW JERSEY: A THREE HUN-
DRED YEAR HISTORY 243 (1973) (The number of dairy herds in New Jersey declined
from 17,624 in 1940 to 2000 in 1964.). For some of the effects of declining numbers of
farms and increasing use of machines, see WPA, TRENDS IN EMPLOYMENT IN AGRI-
CULTURE, 1909-1936, at 26 (1936) (showing a 27% decline in agricultural employment
in the eastern dairy region between 1909 and 1936).
70 See Hood, 336 U.S. at 526-27; Record at 1-5, 27.
71 See Record at 24-25, Hood.
72 See Hood, 336 U.S. at 528-29.
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The Commissioner's findings were expressed in the capsule lan-
guage of the statute. The hearing record suggests, however, that the
license was denied because the Commissioner believed that Hood was
attempting to gain control of milk distribution in the Albany-Troy
milkshed. Hood planned to spend approximately $40,000 to $50,000 to
build a receiving facility at Greenwich with a capacity of about 800
cans a day.73 During the previous year, Hood had expanded the storage
capacity of its Eagle Bridge plant by 600"cans a day.74 Together, these
expansions would have increased Hood's local capacity by more than
fifty percent, from 2600 to 4000 cans a day. Hood claimed that it ex-
pected to process only about 350 cans a day in the peak season at
Greenwich and that it expected to attract only between twenty and
thirty new producers to the new plant.75 These claims seemed starkly
at odds with both the projected capital expenditures at Greenwich and
the testimony of Hood's production manager indicating that the facility
could process in fourteen minutes the entire volume of milk Hood
claimed it would divert from Eagle Bridge. 6 It seems implausible that
Hood would have built the Greenwich facility intending to run it at
less than half its capacity. Hood's proposed expansion seemed to be a
bid for control of local milk production. Thus, the Commissioner
reached the following conclusions: that Hood would likely use its sub-
stantial capital resources to raise initial prices to producers, thereby
drawing their trade to its plants; that because of increased costs other
plants would be forced to close; and that Hood would then cut prices to
local producers.
7 7
This scenario was plausible. At the time of its application to build
at Greenwich, Hood was aggressively attempting to expand its already
dominant position in the New England milkshed, and the company's
strong capital position allowed it to sustain short-term losses to increase
its market share.78 On the other side of the equation, the eight non-
73 See Record at 27-28, Hood (testimony of W.O. Whiting, Hood's Assistant Pro-
duction Manager).
74 See id. at 31-32.
71 See id. at 37-38 (testimony of G.L. Gould, Hood's Division Superintendent).
76 See id. at 33.
7 See Hood, 336 U.S. at 528-29. The Commissioner stated that Hood was able to
pay temporarily higher prices because of the higher minimum prices permitted by the
Boston Milk Marketing Board, noting that during the preceding season Hood had paid
premium prices for grade A milk. See id.
78 See A Resolution Creating a Select Committee to Conduct a Study and Investi-
gation of the Problems of Small Business: Hearings on H.R. Res. 51 Before the Spe-
cial Subcomm. of the House Select Comm. on Small Business, 86th Cong., 2d Sess.
452-53 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Small Business Hearings]. Hood was the largest
dairy processor in New England. See id. The ability of a large firm, like Hood, to
sustain short-term losses underlies the practice of predatory pricing, whereby a large
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Hood processing plants in the Salem-Eagle Bridge-Greenwich area
were all operating at well below full capacity.79 Any substantial dimi-
nution in the volume of milk they received would have raised their per
unit costs above their marginal returns, driving them out of business."0
The perceived threat of monopsony,8 ' in short, was solidly grounded in
the economic facts of regional milk production.
In addition to considering the possible immediate effects of Hood's
diversion of any significant part of the local milk supply, the Commis-
sioner anticipated that Hood's expansion of its processing operations
would have irreversible long-term effects on the structure of local dairy-
ing. This perception was also plausible. Hood's proposed expansion, if
successful, would have increased the long-run average capital costs of
milk processing. Thus, it would have become increasingly difficult for
new processors to enter the market."2 Likewise, it was plausible that
firm cuts prices to the point of losing money in order to drive competitors out of busi-
ness. See R. POSNER, supra note 12, at 223-33.
" See Record at 56, 58, Hood.
80 The smaller plants' variable costs would have diminished as they produced less
milk, but their fixed costs would have remained the same; apportioned over fewer units
of milk, their average costs would have increased. See P. SAMUELSON, supra note 32, at
443 (Per unit cost equals total cost divided by the number of units produced.). The
Commissioner relied heavily on a study by the Cornell University School of Agriculture
that found that the volume of milk handled was the critical variable in determining the
profits of a milk processor. See Record at 12, Hood (citing CORNELL UNIVERSITY AG-
RICULTURAL EXPERIMENT STATION, BULL. No. 473, THE COST OF HANDLING
FLUID MILK AND CREAM IN COUNTRY MILK PLANTS). The Commissioner also cited
a February 1946 report of the New York State Temporary Commission on Agriculture
that determined that 300 cans a day was the break-even point for a milk processor. See
id.
" As discussed above, supra note 63, a monopsony occurs when a single pur-
chaser controls a market. In theory, one might expect monopsony power to be less
effective in a situation such as that presented in Hood, where demand was generally
lagging behind supply and federally established minimum prices had established a floor
below which Hood could not drive prices. Milk production, however, is cyclical. In the
dry season, even if demand lagged behind supply, there could be shortages causing
temporary price surges. See, e.g., J. BLACK, supra note 28, at 183 (showing decreases
in the milk supply between March and October). This seems to have been the case in
the Albany-Troy region. According to the testimony in Hood, Troy suffered from regu-
lar milk shortages in the fall and winter. Hood, 336 U.S. at 528; Record at 51-52
(describing a shortage in Troy during the preceding season). In these time periods,
monopsonistic power would be a substantial advantage. Furthermore, Hood originated
in March 1946, in the immediate post-war period, when prices were still rising. See
supra note 19. The theory of monopsony suggests that it is exactly at such times that
the monopsonist stands to gain the most.
12 The number of new entrants in any economic activity will be partly a function
of the costs of entry. The higher those costs, the fewer the number of competitors that
will have the capital or credit to enter. The railroad industry is an obvious example.
See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 12, at 227-28.
It might be argued that if Hood could profit in the Albany-Troy region, then
other competitors would enter the market. If Hood's profits were sufficiently large, this
proposition would probably be true. Milk processors, however, were operating on slim
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once the economic ante of milk processing had been sufficiently upped,
many small local processors would fail. 3 Faced with these considera-
tions, the Commissioner quite reasonably concluded that if Hood suc-
ceeded in obtaining a monopsonistic advantage, that advantage would
likely endure.
The probable effects of Hood's expansion would have been partic-
ularly hard on local farmers who, in the years immediately before
Hood's application, had attempted through local cooperatives to capture
a part of the milk processing and distribution chain."s A major obstacle
to these efforts was the cooperatives' inability to capture a sufficient
volume of milk to make processing profitable.8 5 Immediately prior to
Hood's application, however, one cooperative had obtained a favorable
contract with a dairy in the Greenwich area." Both the cooperative's
membership and the Commissioner feared that Hood's expansion
would jeopardize this contract, frustrating what seemed to be a promis-
ing remedy to local farm problems.
8 7
To summarize, the denial of Hood's license was intended to pre-
vent the Boston firm from obtaining a monopsony in the Albany-Troy
milkshed. Had Hood obtained such an advantage, farm prices would
have remained low even had demand risen faster than production. The
capital requirements of Hood's contemplated expansion made it sub-
margins in 1946 and have continued to do so for nearly 40 years, making the profitabil-
ity of the dairy industry slight. See, e.g., Small Business Hearings, supra note 78, at
465-66 (focusing on the problems facing milk processors in the area surrounding
Springfield, Massachusetts). Compare, e.g., USDA, AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS 1982,
at 338 table 491 with USDA, AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS 1946, at 384 table 500 (The
dairy industry has not been especially profitable since 1946, and as a result over two-
thirds of the dairy farms in the New York reporting area went out of business between
1946 and 1982.). Thus, in reality, processors have had few incentives to enter new
markets.
Although some local dairies might have been able to obtain sufficient credit to
compete with Hood, and a few of their operators might have had the skill to expand
their operations to a New England-wide operation, it is reasonable to conclude that
many of the local dairies would have been unable to obtain the necessary credit or
would have lacked the necessary managerial skill to do so. See supra note 60.
83 Even if some small dairies and farmers could have entered the processing busi-
ness, the oversupply of milk products would have sharply limited their potential. Given
the relatively inelastic demand for agricultural products, competitors would have had to
operate more cheaply than Hood to survive.
'4 See Record at 49-51, Hood (testimony of J.F. Pratt, Subdistrict President of the
Dairymen's League Cooperative Association, describing the history of the League).
85 See id. at 50-51. In an attempt to consolidate a sufficient supply to process milk
profitably, the League had recently closed its own plant at Greenwich. See id.
"' See id. at 62-63 (describing a local cooperative's contract with Gold Medal
Farms).
87 Since volume of milk was the critical factor in successful processing, see supra
note 80, and the League was struggling to attain a sufficient volume, the loss of supply
would clearly have hindered the League's success.
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stantially less probable that local producers or farmers could success-
fully compete for milk processing business. In the long run, the effect of
the Greenwich plant would have been to reduce farm incomes and re-
turns, erode farmer bargaining power, and exacerbate the economic
forces leading to increases in farm size and decreases in farm
numbers."'
B. Justice Jackson's Majority Opinion
The New York Supreme Court and the New York Court of Ap-
peals upheld the Commissioner's decision. 9 On appeal to the United
States Supreme Court, Hood argued that the restrictions on its process-
ing capacity impermissibly curtailed interstate commerce. In a five-to-
four opinion, the Supreme Court accepted this argument.
Justice Stewart suggested that "[n]o man ever came to the Court
with a larger concept of the federal commerce power"9 than Justice
s As discussed above, supra text accompanying notes 17-23, these economic
forces led to a massive migration from farms to cities, decreasing the number of farms
and farmers.
9 See H.P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 271 A.D. 394, 66 N.Y.S.2d 732 (App.
Div.) (per curiam), 297 N.Y. 209, 78 N.E.2d 476 (1946), rev'd, 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
Both New York courts relied partly on the Supreme Court decision in Nebbia v. New
York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). Nebbia upheld the provisions of article 25, which author-
ized the Commissioner to set retail prices for milk, on the grounds that milk production
was a business imbued with a public interest and-in its most famous passage-on the
rationale that "neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government
cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or
exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm." Id. at 523 (footnotes omitted).
The appellate division of the New York Supreme Court confined its review to whether
or not there were adequate grounds for the Commissioner's decision. See Hood, 271
A.D. at 395, 66 N.Y.S.2d at 733. But one judge noted that in Nebbia "the production
of milk was determined to be a local business which might be regulated in the public
interest and in the public welfare." Hood, 271 A.D. at 396, 66 N.Y.S.2d at 734 (Hill,
J., concurring). On appeal, the state's highest court considered the constitutional issue
and likewise found that the Commissioner's decision was the kind of local decision
permitted by Nebbia. See Hood, 297 N.Y. at 215, 78 N.E.2d at 478.
The United States Supreme Court had previously considered the validity of part of
the New York milk regulation scheme and of a similar program operated in Pennsylva-
nia. In Milk Bd. v. Eisenberg Co., 306 U.S. 346 (1939), the Court upheld Pennsylva-
nia's right to impose licensing and bonding requirements on all milk processors and to
regulate the prices paid to producers. The burden on interstate commerce was found to
be "incidental and not forbidden by the Constitution." Id. at 353. In Baldwin v. G.A.F.
Seelig, 294 U.S. 511 (1935), the Court sustained a commerce clause attack on New
York's attempt to prevent the sale of milk from Vermont at wholesale prices lower than
the prevailing wholesale price of New York milk. In Baldwin, the Court established
the linguistic formulae that "the peoples of the several states must sink or swim to-
gether," id. at 523, and that a state may not establish "an economic barrier against'
competition with the products of another state," id. at 527. This idea became one basis
for Justice Jackson's opinion in Hood.
'0 Stewart, Robert H. Jackson's Influence on Federal-State Relationships, in
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON, FOUR LECTURES IN His HONOR 57, 68 (1969).
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Jackson and that the Hood opinion represented the "most extreme
reach" of Jackson's expansive vision of national economic power.91
Stewart's evaluation is well founded. The tone of the Hood majority
opinion is mythopoeic; its language is ebullient. In its most famous par.-
agraph, Jackson's opinion made economic nationalism a core value of
American constitutionalism:
Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every
farmer and every craftsman shall be encouraged to produce
by the certainty that he will have free access to every market
in the Nation, that no home embargoes will withhold his ex-
ports, and no foreign state will by customs duties or regula-
tions exclude them. Likewise, every consumer may look to
the free competition from every producing area in the Nation
to protect him from exploitation by any. Such was the vision
of the Founders; such has been the doctrine of this Court
which has given it reality.
92
In moving toward this paean to economic nationalism, Justice
Jackson made three related arguments: (1) that section 258-c as applied
to Hood curtailed competition by limiting the "volume of interstate
commerce to aid local economic interests"; 93 (2) that the denial of
Hood's application disrupted "normal" patterns of commerce;94 and (3)
that although New York might pass "social" legislation to aid farmers,
it could not pass "economic" legislation like that which led to the denial
of Hood's licensing application.95 None of these arguments followed in-
eluctably from either the facts of Hood or the application of economic
or social principles to those facts.
Jackson's conclusion that section 258-c limited competition and
curtailed the volume of interstate commerce is difficult to understand.
The New York scheme was consistent with the very terms of his opin-
ion: every farm had a market for its milk; section 258-c placed no limit
on the amount of milk a farmer might produce or sell; and every local
processor was free either to enter the Boston market or to export milk
from New York.9" In short, the denial of the license to Hood affected
91 Id. at 70.
92 Hood, 336 U.S. at 539. But cf. supra note 37 (comparing Jefferson's apprecia-
tion of farmers with his suspicion of merchants).
93 Id. at 530-31.
" See id. at 537 (citing Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 403-04 (1947)).
"5 See id. at 538.
" As observed above, see supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text, the immobil-
ity of agricultural capital limits short-run adaptations to market changes. Given the
surplus of milk in the region, even if Hood had paid a short-term premium, that price
increase would probably not have lasted long. See supra note 81.
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only the scale of the company's operations; it did not prevent the com-
pany from conducting interstate trade in milk. Moreover, section 258-c
was designed and applied to prevent a single firm from obtaining a
monopsony in the milk distribution business; that is, it was designed to
increase rather than to diminish long-run competition for farm prod-
ucts. The principles that Jackson used to justify the Hood decision
were poorly suited to the facts of the case.
This disjunction between principle and fact suggests that Jackson's
decision followed from assumptions other than those he articulated.
The "burden" on commerce that Jackson found in section 258-c was
not quantitative or empirically discoverable. Rather, it was a predicted
burden, grounded in assumptions about the probable operation of the
market. To find that section 258-c burdened commerce, Jackson had to
assume that by expanding the size of its operations Hood would achieve
economies of scale, that these economies would result in lower retail
prices and stimulate the demand for milk, and that in response to this
demand milk production would increase. Given the prevailing econom-
ics of the milk industry, none of these assumptions was particularly
well founded.97 More important, none had clear constitutional status.
" Elasticities of demand are relatively low in agriculture. See, e.g., L. TWEETEN,
supra note 17, at 197. Thus, even if Hood had lowered retail prices it is unlikely that
demand would have increased substantially. Because by 1949 there was already a bur-
geoning surplus of milk at low prices, any effect of a further diminution in prices
would be small. More important, perhaps, Hood's ability to cut retail prices further
was constrained by the federally required minimum wholesale price for milk, see supra
note 54 and accompanying text, and by the competitive situation in the Boston milk
market, where the spread between minimum and retail prices was relatively small. See,
e.g., USDA, AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS 1947, at 385 tables 507-508, 387 table 510.
The most important point, however, is not that the Commissioner's economic rea-
soning was more plausible than Jackson's in the historical context of New York dairy
farming, but rather that Jackson substituted his economic reasoning for that of the
Commissioner. Given the absence of applicable federal law, there were no constitu-
tional grounds that required him to do so. Prior commerce clause decisions that found
impermissible restrictions on commerce rested on factual showings that the law in ques-
tion presently burdened commerce, not on a theoretical prediction that there would be
less of a good in commerce at some future point were the law upheld than there would
be if the law were stricken. See supra note 7.
Under section 258, every gallon of milk produced in the Albany-Troy milkshed
could have been shipped to the Boston market. Ironically, the only possible legal con-
straint on doing so was section 5-8c(5) of the Act of Aug. 24, 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-
320, 49 Stat. 750, 754 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 608c(5) (1982)), which
prohibited payment of federal minimum prices to new entrants in a market for a period
of three months if those minimums exceeded minimum prices in the entrant's old mar-
ket. This provision was intended to provide for the orderly expansion of milk marketing
areas. By preventing New York competitors of Hood from obtaining high Boston
prices, it prevented other marketers from competing equally with Hood in Boston. An
argument could have been raised (but was not) that federal law prevented Hood's ex-
pansion of its facilities, on the grounds that Hood would be able to take advantage of
the differential pricing created by this regulation and by the difference between New
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The interest that Jackson found constitutionally protected was that of
agricultural buyers in expanding the size of their operations. And Hood
can be read to state simply that the interests of economic entities in
expanding their businesses cannot be constrained by any state's political
process.
Similarly, Jackson's notion that the denial of a license to Hood
disrupted "normal" channels of commerce by imposing an "'artificial
rigidity on the economic pattern of the industry' "" is difficult to un-
derstand as anything other than the constitutionalization of the interests
of existing businesses. To begin, there is no such thing as a natural
economy. Any economy is a human contrivance, and the only real
choice we have is how to organize economic life.99 As article 21 implic-
itly recognized, the shape of any agricultural economy is determined by
a complex set of humanly determined arrangements, including the state
of technology, the size of market areas, and federal and state regula-
tions.1"' Justice Jackson's denial of the contingency of economic ar-
York and Boston minimum prices to obtain a purchasing monopsony and eventually to
diminish the volume of milk flowing in interstate commerce.
" Hood, 336 U.S. at 537 (quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 384 U.S. 385, 403-04
(1947)).
9 One commentator recently remarked that "[tihere are no free markets, only
markets controlled by capitalists, kings, communists, or pirates." Address by George
Gerbner, Dean of the Annenberg School of Communications of the University of Penn-
sylvania, A Symposium in Commemoration of the Trial of John Peter Zenger (Oct. 25,
1985) [on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review].
100 Any market or economy functions within the limitations set by a host of social
institutions. Richard Posner notes, for example, that "[t]he choice is rarely between a
free market and public regulation. Ordinarily the choice is between two methods of
public control . . . ." R. POSNER, supra note 12, at 271; see also P. SAMUELSON,
supra note 32, at 41-42 (noting that choices within a market depend on the social
distribution of wealth). See generally C. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS (1977)
(comprehensive analysis of the interaction between economics and social institutions).
The laws of property, for example, determine what can be owned and what can be
sold. The distribution of. wealth determines who can pay what for which goods. Status
and class determine who will have access to opportunities. For one of the best analyses
of the relations between an economy, political theory, and beliefs about human nature,
see C. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM:
HOBBES TO LOCKE 263-72 (1962) (summarizing the basic tenets of seventeenth-cen-
tury liberalism, which are "peculiarly appropriate to a possessive market society be-
cause they state certain essential facts that are peculiar to that society"). As discussed
above, see supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text, Jackson's assertion that the eco-
nomic configuration of mid-twentieth-century America was somehow natural rather
than time- and culture-specific is best understood as a way of reifying that configura-
tion and protecting it from analysis.
The crux of the issue can be highlighted by a brief consideration of the ways in
which economists of different persuasions view Adam Smith. Smith's contentions that
humans are by nature inclined "to truck, barter and exchange one thing for another,"
that they are motivated principally by self-interest and are of differing talents, and that
the interaction of these attributes produces a commercial society can all be taken as true
for this consideration. See A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF
1986]
686 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
rangements and his attribution of extra-human, "law-like" force to the
contemporary economy was in effect a choice for the unconstrained op-
eration of the existing market, whatever the cost for New York dairy
farmers. By subordinating the human process of creating an economy to
a higher-order generalization, Jackson foreclosed the possibility of posi-
tive statutory solutions to economic and social problems, at least by a
state. l ol
In more particular terms, Jackson's finding that section 258-c bur-
dened commerce and disrupted the natural economic pattern of the
milk industry effectively constitutionalized the existing distribution of
industrial wealth. Hood's capacity to expand its New York operations
was a function of its current capital position. That capital position was
a function of the prior operation of the market, that is, of a historical
process that took its particular form because of the distribution of
wealth. 10 2 In protecting Hood's future interest in obtaining possible
economies of scale or a larger share of the Boston milk market, Jackson
implicitly legitimated the distributional status quo.
But Jackson's opinion did not merely legitimate that status quo; it
also enhanced Hood's relative position within it. Legal rules that shape
the economic operations of a society are entitlements-that is, alloca-
tions of the right to engage in particular forms of economic behavior.103
THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 12-16 (1966) (lst ed. London 1776). People, of course, are
also inclined to subject others to their dominion and to rape, murder, and pillage, as
well as to love, honor, and admire. What is at issue is what one does with what one
takes to be human nature. Our society tends to regard the human propensity to protect
one's self-interest as a good thing, as an attribute to be encouraged. See, e.g., P. SAMU-
ELSON, supra note 32, at 1. Other societies do not. See, e.g., C. LINDBLOM, supra, at
98-99. What we often forget is that the decision to give relatively free rein to one
human propensity is historically specific. As MacPherson so exhaustively describes in
his brilliant study of seventeenth-century thought, the English, at least, abandoned me-
dieval notions of communality during that century and opted instead for a definition of
humans as acquirers. See C. MACPHERSON, supra, at 263-72.
101 Jackson's solution did not, of course, foreclose federal legislation on the prob-
lem. As discussed below, however, the deflection of discourse from the state to the na-
tional level affected enormously the possible outcomes of debate. See infra notes 154-68
and accompanying text. Given the rapidly diminishing power of rural interests at the
national level, this deflection was in its practical effect a decision for the interests of
nationally organized business. Justice Black's criticism of the majority focused in par-
ticular on this shift from the local to the national level. See infra notes 126-29 and
accompanying text.
102 As discussed above, see supra note 100, the choices made in any market will be
a function of the distribution of wealth, that is, of the constraints that limit the parame-
ters within which individual preferences can be expressed. See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra
note 12, at 10; P. SAMUELSON, supra note 32, at 41-42; Baker, The Economic Analysis
of Law, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 14-15 (1975); Tribe, Policy Science: Analysis or Ideol-
ogy, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 66, 79-81 & n.36 (1972).
103 One of the best sustained demonstrations of this principle is Richard Posner's
Economic Analysis of Law. See R. POSNER, supra note 12. As Posner shows, any legal
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Jackson might have described his Hood decision as simply the transfer
of the right to control the size of Hood's New York operations from the
state legislature to Hood. But he did not. By describing Hood's right to
expand as "natural," he gave law-like status to a highly contingent
bundle of economic rights. In so doing, he effectively insulated business
size from control by political processes.
As Jackson noted, New York could continue to pass social laws,
for the commerce clause did not authorize "federal interference with
social conditions" in the states."" This notion of a sharp, discoverable
distinction between social and economic legislation, mirroring a suppos-
edly similar distinction in the world, ignored the exact problem that
both the Depression and article 21 placed squarely before the Supreme
Court and the nation: namely, that there is no way to separate social
from economic conditions.1 5 The attempt to divide legally the complex
decision has economic consequences, because as a result of the decision people may or
may not perform acts that in turn have value. To pick but one example, if monopolies
were legal then valuable rights would be allocated differently than if they were illegal.
See id. at 231-36. In Hood, the right to expand was valuable to Hood; the right to keep
Hood from expanding was valuable to smaller, traditional New York farmers.
Whatever the outcome, the decision represented an allocational choice.
Such choices can be made only with reference to normatively grounded criteria for
determining how rights should be allocated. It is the courts' function in our society to
articulate those criteria. People can and do disagree deeply about them. See, e.g., C.
LINDBLOM, supra note 100, at 76 (noting that markets are good for some things and
not for others); R. POSNER, supra note 12, at 10-12 (arguing that efficiency, defined as
the set of choices that would be made given the prevailing forms of social and govern-
mental organization and the prevailing distribution of wealth, should be the normative
basis for making decisions); Baker, supra note 102, at 8 (arguing that the "economic
analysis of [a] legal dispute cannot take the distribution [of wealth and rights] as given
since the dispute is over what the distribution is"); Tribe, supra note 102, at 106
(criticizing approaches such as Posner's for their tendency to "warp reality in certain
patterned ways").
104 Hood, 336 U.S. at 534.
105 Karl Polanyi argues that a similar intellectual operation was at the hearf of
the liberal transformation of western society in the nineteenth century. See K. Po-
LANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF
OuR TIMES 68-71 (1957). In brief, Polanyi argues that this transformation was
grounded in the idea of the "self-regulating market." In his terms, traditional societies
regarded the economic order "as a function of the social, in which it was contained.
[Thus, nineteenth-century] society, in which economic activity was isolated and im-
puted to a distinctive economic motive, was, indeed, a singular departure." Id. at 71. As
Polanyi notes, a bifurcation of culture into "economic" and "social" spheres underlies
two basic "liberal" precepts: the state should not allow anything to inhibit the forma-
tion of markets, and sales should be the only permissible source of income. Id. at 69.
The result, according to Polanyi, was the subordination of society to the laws of the
market. Id. at 71.
A full study of the notion that social matters may be separated from economic
matters and of the effect that this proposition has had on the development of American
constitutional doctrine would require many pages. No one would deny that social and
economic conditions can be plausibly isolated from each other for the purposes of study.
An anthropologist can study a kinship system, for example, without investigating its
19861
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whole that is society serves only to subordinate social reality to eco-
nomic theory. Article 21 was an attempt to structure the modern econ-
omy to mitigate its harshest effects upon the farm communities of New
York. Its failure to pass constitutional muster meant that no rural lo-
cality could insulate itself from these effects, even if such insulation
neither affected interstate commerce in any quantitative, immediate
way, nor discriminated between the citizens of different states.
The theoretical, legal, and economic consequences of Jackson's
reasoning, then, were enormous. The primary assumptions of the opin-
ion-that the existing distribution of wealth and the right of business to
expand were "natural"-disjoined economics from politics. The as-
sumption that society existed apart from its economic underpinnings
shifted control of social processes from politics to the market. By subor-
dinating politics, society, and the Constitution to the market, Jackson
confirmed the social and economic status quo. In the process, New
York's dairy farmers were flung back upon that market. Over time,
they went out of business.
106
economic characteristics. In doing so, however, the anthropologist is not claiming that a
kinship system has no economic characteristics, but only that for the purposes of clarity
she is choosing not to focus on them. Jackson's claim, however, seems to presuppose
that social and economic domains are in fact isolated.
A simple example demonstrates the problematic character of this formulation.
Most would concede that the "family" is a social institution. Yet it is clear that the
family structure has profound economic consequences. Societies that practice partible
inheritance, for example, will generally be characterized by smaller landholdings and
different methods of agricultural organization as compared with societies practicing
primogenitary inheritance. Alternatively, it is equally clear that when the economic
bases of partible inheritance are eroded by the continued parceling of lands to the point
where owners can no longer earn a living from their holdings, new inheritance patterns
may be created. See, e.g., P. GREVEN, FOUR GENERATIONS: POPULATION, LAND, AND
FAMILY IN ANDOVER, MASSACHUSETTS 136 (1970). In short, the social institution of
inheritance and the economic practice of agriculture are inseparable.
In Hood, Jackson seemed to be saying that whatever interest New York farmers
or milk processors may have had in living in communities of small-scale enterprises was
not a social interest, even though such an interest would seem preeminently social. As
discussed below, see infra notes 142-44 and accompanying 'text, Justices Black and
Frankfurter in dissent recognized the inseparability of social and economic institutions
and framed the matter as a problem of federalism, namely, of determining which do-
mains of social and economic life would be allocated to the states and which to the
federal government. Article 21, like much other agricultural legislation during the De-
pression, recognized the inseparability of social and economic phenomena and sought to
achieve a particular desired social configuration by manipulating the variables in the
economic equation. See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text. In effect, Jackson
was saying that this social solution was not constitutionally acceptable.
'o The number of New York farms declined from about 150,000 in 1946 to about
49,000 in 1982. Compare USDA, AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS 1982, at 386 table 556
with USDA, AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS 1946, at 525 table 579.
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C. The Hood Dissents
The majority opinion in Hood closed a quarter century in which
the reach of the federal commerce power was the subject of continual
constitutional debate.1 7 By weaving together deep oppositions in Amer-
ican culture-between farmer and businessman, country and town, past
and present, legislature and court, and state and nation-into a vision
of an America sustained by ceaseless growth, productivity, and prosper-
ity, Justice Jackson's opinion maintained metaphorical touch with the
past at the very moment that it moved unhaltingly into the future. This
rhetorical sleight of hand did not go unnoticed or uncontested. In sepa-
rate dissents, Justices Black and Frankfurter attacked Jackson's vision,
preferring apparently the older, small-scale world that Hood was leav-
ing behind.
The dissenters organized their disagreement with Justice Jackson
around the subtle but significant shift in commerce clause analysis ef-
fected by the Hood majority opinion. In their view, Jackson's opinion
was a radically "new constitutional formula"1 ' that rested on a sweep-
ing reevaluation of the Court's role in interpreting the commerce
clause.'09
Their first point of attack was doctrinal. As Justice Black ob-
served, article 21 was the result of extensive and careful study" 0 of the
social and economic problems at which the law was aimed.'" Depres-
sion history, Black argued, showed these ills to be pervasive," 2 and the
New York law provided an appropriate means for their alleviation." 3
Article 21, he continued, did not discriminate against interstate com-
merce, nor had it been applied discriminatorily to Hood." 4 Thus,
Black concluded, although due process considerations might invalidate
laws that were ill-considered, irrational, or overbroad, commerce clause
doctrine could be used only to invalidate laws that discriminated in
purpose or application against interstate commerce. In Black's view, no
constitutional standard yet enunciated by the Court justified Jackson's
10I See supra note 7.
108 See Hood, 336 U.S. at 545 (Black, J., dissenting).
10. See id. at 563 n.14.
110 See id. at 546.
111 See id. at 547.
112 See id. at 546 (citing Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 515-16 (1934)).
118 See id. at 547.
114 See id. at 549. Black also observed that had a New York milk dealer wished to
expand, its application also would have been rejected, and had a New York dealer
wished to send his milk to Boston, article 21 would not have precluded the shipment.
See id. at 548.
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conclusion.
1 1 5
The dissenters' second point of attack was factual. As Black char-
acterized it, article 21 did not burden commerce in any empirically
identifiable way.116 Rather, it channeled milk in and out of New York
in a manner that the people of the state found desirable. In his words,
"there [was] no evidence whatever to show that fair enforcement of
the . . . law would limit the total volume of New York milk available
for shipment into other states." ' Given that the burdens Jackson dis-
covered were not actual but theoretical, Black again concluded, prior
case law did not require invalidation. 18
Justice Frankfurter analyzed the issue somewhat differently. Even
if article 21 "burdened" commerce, he argued, the very idea of the com-
merce clause was that it was "sometimes-of course not always-of
greater importance that local interests be protected than that interstate
commerce be not touched." 1 9 "'[C]ommerce interpenetrates the
States,' " Frankfurter noted, "'and no undisputed generality about the
freedom of commerce from state encroachment can delimit in advance
the interacting areas of state and national power . . "120 In Frank-
furter's view, the federal system required a resolution of the tensions
between state and federal sovereign governments, economies, and social
systems; to resolve such conflicts without exploring their substantive so-
cial and economic implications was to avoid the challenge of the
Constitution.
Regardless of their differences in approach, the dissenters agreed
that a court confronted with the kind of deep-seated social and eco-
nomic conflict presented by Hood should evaluate closely the competing
interests at hand-the interests of farmers and industrialists, state and
nation, legislatures and Court. Black expressed the matter succinctly,
arguing that "decision on such an issue required a consideration of
facts such as the nature of the regulation, the character of the business,
[and] the regulation's actual effect on interstate commerce. 1* 21 Justice
Frankfurter was more oblique, concluding his argument with a long
list of rhetorical questions regarding the economy of the Albany-Troy
region, the dairy business there, and the commercial impact of the
law. 122
"l See id. at 552, 554-55.
116 See id. at 561.
117 Id.
118 See id.
Id. at 567 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
120 Id. (quoting Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, 322 U.S. 202, 210 (1944)).
Id. at 553 (Black, J., dissenting).
122 See id. at 573-74 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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Both dissenters rejected out of hand Justice Jackson's transposition
of a complex substantive and normative discourse about the structure of
social and economic life into the mechanical application of a theoretical
economic principle. The majority, they argued, had substituted abstract
principles for the concrete confrontation with social and economic real-
ity that the commerce clause demanded and had shirked the Court's
duty to resolve economic, social, political, and ideological conflict. 23
The result was to free many businesses entirely from regulation and to
render elected representatives impotent to frame rules to govern this
dynamic civilization.
12 4
The dissenters similarly contested the rigid dichotomization of so-
cial and economic life that was the critical first step in the intellectual
process by which Justice Jackson elevated to constitutional status the
existing distribution of legal and political rights and wealth. To protect
Hood from the burden of section 258-c was to protect that distribution
as well. In contrast to Jackson, both dissenting Justices conceptualized
social and political processes as ongoing contests between different
groups and interests. Inevitably, such deep-seated conflicts would re-
quire resolution by the Court. The proper response was not to retreat
to reified abstractions, but to make normative judgments on the basis of
substantive considerations. Indeed, both dissents suggested that the ab-
stracted approach of Justice Jackson merely concealed the judgments
that necessarily were being made.
In Frankfurter's terms, the majority simply preferred the interests
of the merchant to those of farmers. 5 Justice Black was more vehe-
ment. In his view, the decision removed most local business from regu-
lation,126 unleashed aggressive cupidity upon American life, 2 ' and in
the process resurrected the discredited philosophy of Lochner v. New
York..' 28
The judicially directed march of the due process philos-
ophy as an emancipator of business from regulation ap-
peared arrested a few years ago. That appearance was illu-
sory. That philosophy continues its march. The due process
clause and commerce clause have been used like Siamese
twins in a never-ending stream of challenges to government
123 See id. at 545, 551-52 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 568 n.2 (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
124 See id. at 545 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 563 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
125 See id. at 573 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
126 See id. at 545 (Black, J., dissenting).
122 See id. at 562.
L28 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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regulation ...
. . . Both clauses easily lend themselves to inordinate
expansions of this Court's power at the expense of legislative
power.1 29
Black's invocation of Lochner was telling. Like Hood, Lochner
preferred business concerns to social concerns,18 0 but the similarities be-
tween the two decisions were not merely in their results. Like Hood,
Lochner was grounded in the assumptions that economic and social life
could intelligibly be kept separate in legal analysis and that legal deci-
sions could be made on the basis of principles independent of the par-
ticular social and economic conflict before the Court.1"' In recalling
Lochner, Black sought to discredit not only the Hood result, but also its
jurisprudence. To use constitutional doctrine to protect commerce from
a future burden predicted by an economic theory, he seems to have
been suggesting, was to prevent the Court from playing out its proper
cultural role as an arbiter of society's conflicts, and to commit it instead
to a particular theory of political economy. In short, the dissenters con-
ceptualized the Court not as an enforcer of rules, but as a participant
in an ongoing process of culture building.
On the basis of an inquiry into the actual effects of article 21,
Justice Black would have upheld the statute. Its principal purpose, in
his characterization, was to promote the general welfare by protecting
farmers from impoverishment and insolvency."3 2 Taking a page from
Jackson's book of economic theory, Black argued that, given the struc-
ture of the agricultural market, the possibility of monopsony in the Al-
bany-Troy region was real..3 and the possible effects could be disas-
trous for farmers . 34 Under the rule of Nebbia v. New York,"3 5 he
'19 Hood, 336 U.S. at 562-63 (Black, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
130 See 198 U.S. at 57-58 (relying on the fourteenth amendment's guarantee
against deprivations of liberty without due process of law to overturn a bakery owner's
misdemeanor conviction under a New York statute that prohibited workweeks of longer
than 60 hours for bakery employees).
131 Lochner has become one of the most consistently reviled decisions the Court
has ever rendered. Cited approximately 300 times between 1943 and 1984, see 2A
SHEPARD'S UNITED STATES CITATIONS CASE EDITION (5th ed. 1984), Lochner is
invoked nearly universally to suggest that the proponents of a disfavored view have
committed the "Lochnerian fallacy" of permitting their values, instead of someone
else's, to dictate their judgment. In Hood Black used Lochner as a means of noting the
value-laden bases of Justice Jackson's seemingly neutral reasoning. His argument, in
short, was that value-free law is a contradiction in terms because law is about values,
however much one may try to obscure them.
1'2 See Hood, 336 U.S. at 546 (Black, J., dissenting).
's See id. at 547-48.
'1 See id. at 546.
135 291 U.S. 502, 515-16 (1934).
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concluded, Hood's business interest had to give way to the general wel-
fare as defined by the legislature of New York.""6 It was not for Justice
Jackson to substitute his notion of a properly structured market for the
kind of society that the people of New York had chosen to try to
create.
13 7
In contrast to Black, Justice Frankfurter would have remanded
the case for further inquiry.' This procedural difference, however,
dbes not obscure Frankfurter's essential agreement with Black. Given
the importance that the Court had previously attached to the regulation
of agriculture, Frankfurter argued, it seemed incomprehensible to as-
sign, as a matter of law, a "higher . . .place to milk dealers' standards
of bookkeeping than to the economic well-being of their industry."" 9
Like Black, he argued that such legislation properly promoted the gen-
eral welfare.'4 The clear tenor of Frankfurter's opinion is that he
would have upheld the law upon any showing that it was reasonably
calculated to achieve its objectives.
Justices Jackson, Black, and Frankfurter had all served the New
Deal well."" Their thought was deeply grounded in the experiences of
the Depression. But whereas Justice Jackson understood the future to
lie with an ever-expanding market, Justices Black and Frankfurter
reached toward a formulation of that future grounded in an alternative
social vision. Like Justice Brandeis before them, Black and Frankfurter
distrusted deeply the forces of centralized power." 2 Like Brandeis, they
denied that social and economic questions were meaningfully separa-
ble'43 and believed that law could be understood only by understanding
13" See Hood, 336 U.S. at 549 (Black, J., dissenting).
117 See id. at 563-64.
13I See id. at 575-76 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
139 Id. at 573.
140 See id. at 572.
1 See E. GERHART, AMERICA'S ADVOCATE: ROBERT H. JACKSON 240 (1958);
V. HAMILTON, HUGO BLACK: THE ALABAMA YEARs 260 (1972); H. THOMAS, FELIX
FRANKFURTER: SCHOLAR ON THE BENCH 23-41 (1960).
141 See, e.g., J. FRANK, MR. JUSTICE BLACK: THE MAN AND HIS OPINIONS 56
(1949) ("To Black, the militant enforcement of the antitrust laws was the only antidote
that could save a free capitalist system .... "); H. THOMAS, supra note 141, at 92
(describing Frankfurter's role in drafting New Deal legislation that limited industrial
power); Henkin, Voice of a Modern Federalism, in FELIX FRANKFURTER: THE JUDGE
71 (W. Mendelson ed. 1964) (describing Frankfurter's "federalist" belief that the diffu-
sion of power promoted democracy).
143 This Comment does not purport to address the rather complicated theoretical
matter of whether either Justice Black or Justice Frankfurter would have believed that
social and economic matters were separable. Rather, what is important for present pur-
poses is their rejection of the practice of using deductive, a priori categories of "social"
and "economic." See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730-33 (1963) (Black
arguing, as he does in Hood, see supra text accompanying notes 110-17, that a state
legislature should be free to frame rules that shape society without distinguishing be-
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its impact on society.""'
In recognizing that Justice Jackson had solved the problem in
Hood by means of a set of unarticulated assumptions about the nature
of the modern economy, Black and Frankfurter recognized also that he
had imported into commerce clause doctrine a particular vision of
American society that contradicted that of the New York legislature. In
noting that Jackson's analysis resurrected, albeit in a new form, the
substantive due process language of an earlier judicial era, they rightly
observed that the majority opinion ultimately and ineluctably removed
from the citizenry the power to determine how social and economic
rights should be allocated.
Justice Black's response to Jackson's celebration of the new Amer-
ican marketplace was grounded in the Populism of his Alabama boy-
hood. Throughout his career, Black remained the self-styled "candidate
of the masses" that he was in his first congressional election;145
throughout, an odd admixture of individualism, deep distrust of large
institutions, and a search for popular control of society and the econ-
omy guided his public progress and judicial reasoning.146
By comparison with Black's response to Jackson, Frankfurter's
opinion was cerebral, echoing more the halls of Harvard than the
streets of a southern town,147 grounded more in an analytic understand-
ing of American culture, history, and politics than in the immediate
experience of rural society. Frankfurter's response was motivated by a
profound respect for the organic nature of social organization, a deep
appreciation of the fragility of human society, and a keen sense that a
way of American life was passing.
148
tween rigid social and economic categories); H. THOMAS, supra note 141, at 88
(Frankfurter stating that "'in a civilization like ours where the economic interdepen-
dence of society is so pervasive, a sharp division between property rights and human
rights largely falsifies reality' ") (quoting F. FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES 50
(1938)).
144 See J. FRANK, supra note 142, at 139; H. THOMAS, supra note 141, at 97.
145 See J. FRANK, supra note 142, at 65.
148 See G. DUNNE, HUGO BLACK AND THE JUDICIAL REVOLUTION 85 (1977)
(describing Black's attachment to his Clay County, Alabama roots); J. FRANK, supra
note 142, at 11 (describing Black's philosophical affinity with poor whites).
147 See H. THOMAS, supra note 141, at 5-7.
148 See F. FRANKFURTER, Mr. Justice Brandeis and the Constitution, in LAW
AND POLITICS: OCCASIONAL PAPERS OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 1913-1918, at 119
(1971). Less than a decade before Hood, Frankfurter had written:
The ultimate foundation of a free society is the binding tie of cohesive
sentiment. Such a sentiment is fostered by all those agencies of the mind
and spirit which may serve to gather up the traditions of a people, trans-
mit them from generation to generation, and thereby create that continuity
of a treasured common life which constitutes a civilization. "We live by
symbols."
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Yet although the Hood dissenters began at different points and
traveled different paths, a consistent set of assumptions integrated their
dissents: a reverence for the traditional values of small-scale rural de-
mocracy and a deep suspicion of judicial actions that removed the peo-
ple's control over the shape of their society. Above all else, however,
what separated Black and Frankfurter from Jackson was their vision,
rooted in the American past and tracing its heritage ultimately to Jef-
ferson, of a smaller, more individualized, less centralized society. Hood
was a major failure-and possibly, in the sphere of constitutional eco-
nomics, a final failure-for this ideal.
III. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF Hood
The controversy in Hood arose at the end of a long struggle for
political control over the direction of American economic life. Beginning
in the last years of the nineteenth century, nationally organized indus-
tries began to exert increasing control over the American economy.149
Against the forces of massed capital stood a relatively disorganized ar-
ray of groups, including populists, social reformers, and labor, that
never achieved the level of organization and singularity of purpose at-
Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 596 (1940); see also H. THOMAS,
supra note 141, at 45-68 (discussing Frankfurter's notion of culture and cultural
symbols).
149 See R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 18, at 252 (describing the implementation of
the Sherman Antitrust Act in the early years of the twentieth century). Hofstadter
notes that
despite the widespread public agitation over [trusts], the men who took a
conservative view of the needs of the hour never lost control. . . . It
proved impossible for men like Bryan and LaFollette, who did not enjoy
the confidence . . . of the business community, to find their way to the
White House ....
Id. at 250. For a general survey of the rise of monopolies in the closing years of the
nineteenth century, see H. FAULKNER, POLITICS, REFORM AND ExPANSION, 1890-
1900, at 72-93 (1963). For more particularized accounts of the new social and political
order that was taking shape in the years around the turn of the twentieth century, see
T. COCHRAN & W. MILLER, THE AGE OF ENTERPRISE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF IN-
DUSTRIAL AMERICA 140-46 (rev. ed. 1961) (describing the rise of trusts, including U.S.
Steel and Standard Oil); id. at 151-53 (describing the increasing nationalization of
American economic life and the rising power of industrialists); id. at 342-48 (describing
the efforts of business to eliminate regulation in the 1920's). See also J. CHAMBERLAIN,
THE ENTERPRISING AMERICANS: A BUSINESS HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 181
(3d ed. 1963) (describing the coalescence of business power at the national level in the
first quarter of the twentieth century); G. KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATIV-
ISM: A REINTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN HISTORY, 1900-1916, at 282 (1963) ("The
ideological consensus among key business leaders and political leaders fed into a stream
of common action . . ... "); R. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER, 1877-1920, at 293-
96 (1967) (describing political and industrial aspects of the solidification of national
bureaucratic control over American life).
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tained by their opponents. 50 Economic organization became increas-
ingly national in scale, and the opponents of capital were forced in-
creasingly to contest the "fact" of the modern society.
From a short-term point of view, the Depression was the decisive
stage in a process by which the acceptance of a national economy of
industrial capital became a reality. Although some still continued to
argue that this reality, like all others, was contingent and therefore
malleable, the crucial political decision of the Depression was the deci-
sion to accept a national economy and to locate the struggle for control
of that economy in national politics.15'
Hood was one of the last in a line of Supreme Court opinions that
confirmed this configuration of power. That process of confirmation in-
volved three discrete intellectual operations. First, as observed above,
the prevailing economic structure and distribution of wealth were vali-
dated as "natural" or given.' 52 Thus, they were legally incontestable.
Second, the operation of the modern economy was validated as desira-
ble. Thus, even if the national economy was not "real" in the same way
as, say, the law of gravity, it was a good thing. Finally, Justice Jackson
validated his opinion by referring to the myth of the founders.'53 Thus,
even if the national economy was neither real nor desirable, it was con-
stitutional. With this integration of the law of nature, the idea of the
good, and the sanction of tradition, Hood marked a symbolic and rhe-
torical end of the dispute over the proper locus of economic control and
provided a synthesis of values under the aegis of national economic
policy.
This national synthesis disadvantaged the less powerful-workers
as well as farmers-and substantially increased the political power of
industrial capital relative to that of other social interests. National
politics requires money, communications, and organization, areas in
150 For classic, if now dated, surveys of the plethora of reform movements in the
beginning of the twentieth century, see E. GOLDMAN, RENDEZVOUS WITH DESTINY:
A HISTORY OF MODERN AMERICAN REFORM 48, 63 (1952) (describing the differences
between populists and socialists and populists and progressives); R. HOFSTADTER,
supra note 18, at 266 (noting the inability of progressive reformers to articulate a
workable program for dealing with the changing economic structure of society, and
describing the reform movements as an attempt to institutionalize a "mood" of
discontent).
1 See, e.g., W. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW
DEAL 34 (1963) (describing theorists of the New Nationalism as the most influential in
forming New Deal ideology, and describing the Roosevelt brain trust's uniform rejec-
tion of the Brandeis view that the problems of American life would be solved if
America once more became a nation of small proprietors) (citing R. TUGWELL, THE
DEMOCRATIC ROOSEVELT 213 (1957)).
152 See Hood, 336 U.S. at 537-38; see also supra text accompanying notes 102-03.
153 See Hood, 336 U.S. at 539.
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which industrial capitalists have substantial advantages. 54 The deflec-
tion of farm issues to national politics effectively precluded the repre-
sentation of local farm interests and allowed expression to the interests
of only those farmers for whom profits were more important than local
culture. Most important, the very notion of a national farm interest,
itself deeply embedded in the structure of modern industrial society,
contradicted the organizing principles of traditional rural culture.
The obverse of the rise of a national industrial culture is the de-
cline of the traditional rural community. Historically, such communi-
ties were identifiable economic units, integrated only imperfectly into
national or world economies.15 Although they typically produced for
the market, such communities maintained a local political economy or-
ganized less around maximizing market production than around the use
and allocation of resources among members of the community.""" In
contrast to the particularized and fragmented society of modern urban
communities, the social organization of the traditional rural community
was typically "dense. 1 57 Social relations were formed in a complicated
array of settings, including work, school, church, local politics, and vol-
untary organizations. Status was thus determined in a social matrix
rather than along a wealth continuum." 8
1" See R. MILIBAND, THE STATE IN CAPITALIST SOCIETY 161-62 (1969).
155 See, e.g., T. COCHRAN & W. MILLER, supra note 149, at 211 (describing the
demise of local economies in the years after the Civil War); A. VIDICH & J. BENSMAN,
SMALL TOWN AND MASS SOCIETY: CLASS, POWER AND RELIGION IN A RURAL COM-
MUNITY 55-57, 67-69 (1958) (describing the major difference between "rational" and
"traditional" local farmers in terms of the degree to which they respond to outside
economic forces); R. WIEBE, supra note 149, at XIII (arguing that America during the
nineteenth century was a nation of island communities). For the classic theoretical
statement, see R. REDFIELD, PEASANT SOCIETY AND CULTURE 28-29 (1960) (describ-
ing peasant societies as societies in which the world of the market only partly absorbs
the local social world).
156 See R. REDFIELD, supra note 155, at 30 (describing the segregation of local
peasant markets from the larger national market). The classic examples in American
history are the first Puritan communities of New England, in which all members of the
town were given some land and in which unallocated land was held by the town for
distribution to subsequent generations. See, e.g., P. GREVEN, supra note 105, at 41-54.
The classic examples in the European context, of course, are the common fields of the
late medieval village. See id. at 43.
157 For a relatively modem example, see A. VIDICH & J. BENSMAN, supra note
155, at 230 (describing the interaction of kinship, marriage, and family tradition in
determining church membership); id. at 282 ("Decision making in the community is
not a specialized function.").
15" For a classic American example, in which a person's worth was defined by a
complex mixture of wealth, perceived godliness, family connections, education, age, and
varied personal attributes, see E. CooK, THE FATHERS OF THE TOWNS: LEADERSHIP
AND COMMUNITY STRUCTURE IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY NEW ENGLAND 23-62
(1976) (analyzing in detail the influence of wealth, family, education, and other vari-
ables on the choice of leaders in eighteenth-century New England towns); id. at 92-93
(describing the concept of "usefulness," which was used in determining social status for
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Although such communities could never retain all of their young
in the face of demographic growth, their "belief" systems were
grounded in the principles of stasis and replication. 15 As a result, even
though agricultural villages regularly discharged surplus population to
the labor market, they still represented a substantial impediment to the
development of a fully capitalist organization. Local institutions pro-
vided support mechanisms that partly removed the individual from the
pales of market psychology. The curtailment of individual accumulation
in the interest of maintaining the community diminished the potential
supply of industrial labor and slowed the rate of capital accumulation
and concentration. Wide distribution of property ownership insulated
the community from market forces. A world view organized around sta-
sis was incompatible with the ceaseless changes of industrial life.16
Focusing on the historical depth of the migration from agricultural
communities, however, obscures at least as much as it reveals. The
largest proportional displacement of rural peoples in our history has
occurred in the three-and-one-half decades since 1947.1" In 1948,
when Hood was being written, approximately twenty percent of all
Americans still farmed."6 2 In the 1950's, the farm population decreased
by more than seven million people, 6 s and in the 1960's, the exodus
continued at the rate of 600,000 people per year." Today, only three
percent of the American people still farm,6 5 and only about ten percent
still live in places that might be counted as traditionally rural.'66
purposes of seating at meetinghouses, as a combination of age and public service). For
an example of the continuing vitality of affiliational status patterns, see A. VIDICH & J.
BENSMAN, supra note 155, at 260 (describing overlapping leadership roles).
159 For a basic statement of the difference between pre-industrial agrarian belief
systems and industrial, nonagrarian belief systems, see Thompson, Time, Work, Disci-
pline and Industrial Capitalism, 38 PAST & PRESENT 56 (1967). For other discus-
sions, see H. GUTMAN, WORK, CULTURE AND SocIErY IN INDUSTRIALIZING
AMERICA 19-22 (1976) (describing the pre-industrial work habits of the first genera-
tion of American factory workers); C. HILL, SOCIETY & PURITANISM IN PRE-INDUS-
TRIAL ENGLAND 226 (1972) (describing the development of new work habits in the
first phase of the transition to industrial capitalism).
iso See H. GUTMAN, supra note 159, at 19-22.
161 See G. CRAMER & C. JENSEN, supra note 18, at 29 table 2-6.
162 See id.
16 See id.
16 See id.
165 See Bitter Harvest, supra note 29, at 55.
.66 As demographers have observed, it is impossible to obtain a precise count of
the proportion of the population living in places that conform to what is meant by
"rural." Most census data for rural areas are reported under the category of "non-
metropolitan counties," which includes counties on the fringes of major cities. See Pow-
ers & Moe, The Policy Context for Rural Research, in RURAL SOCIETY IN THE
UNITED STATES: ISSUES FOR THE 1980's 14 (D. Dillman & D. Hobbs eds. 1982). The
10% figure is a "guesstimate" achieved by halving 54 million-the total number of
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Hood, then, stood at a critical juncture in the transformation of
America-between a still substantially rural America and modern, ur-
ban America. In rejecting New York's attempt to structure its relation-
ships with Boston capital so as to maximize the possibility of preserving
local, rural culture within the national social system, the Hood majority
endorsed principles lying at the heart of the displacement of people
from the land and the replacement of one form of society and world
view by another.
The idea of the small community is apposite to an understanding
of Justice Jackson's opinion in Hood not only because the idea de-
scribes the socio-historical reality that the Hood opinion rejected, but
also because it provides an alternative to the idea of social organization
endorsed in Hood. In American idiom, that alternative is the Jefferso-
nian ideal of a relatively small-scale, participatory democracy. 1 7 Hood
removed the control of local economics to the national legislative and
political processes. American politics at the national level provides only
for a kind of formalistic citizen participation and denies to the individ-
ual any real possibility of an effective role in decisionmaking.168 Indi-
vidual interests are atomized in national politics, and it is relatively
easy for the organizations of capital to capture the key institutions of
national government. The world that Hood sanctioned is a world in
which individuals have limited ability to shape their economic and so-
cial experience. Hood, to be blunt, authorized the imperialism of the
market and sanctioned the existing distribution of wealth without pro-
viding for meaningful opportunities to define the limits of wealth or the
contours of the market.
It is neither surprising nor ironic that the Supreme Court's confir-
mation of the new national industrial order and rejection of the ideal of
the traditional small rural community came in the context of a chal-
lenge to agricultural legislation that was designed to preserve tradi-
tional rural life. In invalidating that legislation, Hood invalidated that
way of life no less than it invalidated the means of preserving it. In its
historical context, Hood stands as one of the moments in which our
nonmetropolitan residents-and dividing that quotient by 220 million. See also John-
son & Beegle, The Rural American People: A Look Forward and a Look Backward,
in RURAL SOCIETY IN THE UNITED STATES, supra, at 61.
187 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
168 The theoretical formulation used here tracks closely that of Ralph Miliband.
See R. MILIBAND, supra note 154. For some particularly relevant passages dealing
with the relationship between nationalism and the loss of power by some groups, see
id. at 157 (Business is never as divided as labor.); id. at 162 (The business interest is
always claimed to be the national interest.); id. at 171 (describing the general trend of
legislatures to lose power as industrial capitalism expands).
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culture abandoned the rural ideal it had cherished for more than three
centuries, and accepted instead the new industrial world.
CONCLUSION
By 1948, when Justice Jackson was writing his opinion in H.P.
Hood & Sons v. Dumond, the United States had recovered from the
Depression and was entering an era of sustained national prosperity.
The farm economy, however, verged again on recession.169 After a brief
respite during and after World War II, farmers across the land again
faced the familiar prospect of declining prices. What they could not
know was that the coming years would change their lives more than
any similarly short period in the nation's history."' 0 Agricultural pro-
ductivity would triple and average farm size would quadruple, but
farmers' numbers would be thinned nearly by half until farmers consti-
tuted just three percent of our population. American life was about to
be transformed as abruptly and as significantly as it had earlier been
transformed by the opening of the west and the coming of the industrial
revolution. In the wake of this transformation, Jefferson's chosen peo-
ple would become the people left behind.
171
In finding that section 258-c of the New York Agriculture and
Markets Law impermissibly burdened interstate commerce, Justice
Jackson substantially expanded national power by constitutionalizing
the market economy with respect to state economic legislation. In doing
so without suggesting an alternative way for farmers to remedy their
plight, Jackson placed rural localities everywhere at the mercy of eco-
nomic forces beyond their control. Grounded in the microeconomics of
nationalism, his opinion shifted responsibility for economic and social
legislation to national politics. The failure of these politics is another
story. That they failed with respect to traditional rural culture is by
now obvious, for with the prosperity of the 1950's came also the depop-
ulation of rural America and the final capitalization of agriculture and
the countryside.
Such stories about the working out of social processes do not really
end, but they do have moments that look like endings. And something
that looked like the end of this story came on June 26, 1973, when the
Wall Street Journal ran an advertisement that pictured four young
men standing in front of a barn and silo. The advertisement read,
169 See G. FITE, supra note 18, at 95.
17 See id. at 88 (comparing the magnitude of change in rural life during the late
1940's with the transformation brought on in the 1890's by the closing of the frontier).
171 See J. SHOVER, supra note 18, at 102-03; see also supra notes 36-37.
[Vol. 134:657
IDEOLOGY OF HOOD V. DUMOND
"Your industry needs what these boys learned on the farm. They
learned how to work. Hard! ' 172 The transition documented in this ad-
vertisement, from ownership and control of one's labor to dependence
on the capital of others, is of course the centuries-long transition to
capitalism. It is a transition whose last phases were, in part, legally
validated by Hood and accelerated by the kind of thinking on which
that opinion was based. That Jackson himself was a country boy who
had served liberal causes well as Roosevelt's Attorney General17 3 only
underscores the irony of America's liberal alliance with capital.
172 Wall St. J., June 26, 1973, at 12, col. 1 (advertisement).
I See E. GERHART, supra note 141, at 240.
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